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REMOVAL JURISDICTION OVER MASS ACTIONS 
Mallory A. Gitt 
Abstract: The mass action provision in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 provides a 
federal forum for certain state court litigation that resembles class actions but otherwise 
could not be removed. The provision is triggered when state court plaintiffs propose a joint 
trial of common legal or factual issues. But defining what constitutes that triggering event 
has proved difficult for federal courts. They have not used a uniform framework to determine 
when they have subject matter jurisdiction over the purported mass action, and have lacked a 
common interpretation of the statutory language to begin the inquiry. That lack of coherence 
has created confusion for litigants and potentially upset the balance of power between federal 
and state courts. This Comment proposes a uniform framework for federal courts to use in 
construing their subject matter jurisdiction in mass action cases. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mass actions exist because Congress did not trust state courts to 
properly adjudicate aggregate litigation.1 Mass actions were not a formal 
kind of litigation before Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act 
of 20052 (“CAFA”), but were created to stanch the tide of abusive class 
action litigation—at least in Congress’ view.3 Legislation was necessary 
because, according to Congress, an out-of-control system of class action 
litigation had led to unfair results4 and large payouts to greedy plaintiffs’ 
attorneys.5 State courts in particular kept “cases of national importance 
out of Federal court”6 by applying their governing class action rules 
“inconsistently” and “inadequate[ly] supervis[ing]”7 aggregate litigation. 
And stringent diversity jurisdiction rules further kept many defendants 
from removing such suits to federal court.8 Through CAFA, Congress 
gave defendants a new avenue by which to federalize state court 
1. Aggregate litigation “encompass[es] the various procedural techniques used to litigate civil 
claims on a mass or collective basis in such a way as to yield preclusion.” RICHARD A. NAGAREDA 
ET AL., THE LAW OF CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER AGGREGATE LITIGATION 25 (2d ed. 2013). 
2. See generally Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. 
3. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 46 (2005). 
4. Id. at 4. 
5. Id. 
6. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 119 Stat. at 5. 
7. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4. 
8. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 119 Stat. at 5; S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5. 
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litigation. Defendants could now remove state litigation that merely 
resembled a class action. 
A mass action is a different procedural device than a class action.9 
However, the mass action device aggregates litigation so that it generally 
operates the same way as a class action.10 A mass action is formed when 
plaintiffs bring together—or, in the words of the statute, propose a joint 
trial of common issues of fact or law11—state court suits.12 The joined 
suits must also meet CAFA’s other jurisdictional requirements, 
including numerosity and amount in controversy.13 When plaintiffs 
make a “proposal,” the defendant may remove the suits as one 
consolidated suit to federal court.14 It has been unclear, however, what is 
a proposal and how—if at all—federal courts should interpret the effects 
of the “proposal” the plaintiffs have made when the courts determine 
whether they have subject matter jurisdiction.15 
Despite the contention that mass actions would be a rarely used 
procedure,16 the mass action provision has become the subject of intense 
litigation.17 As that litigation has wended its way through the courts, 
defining the contours of the mass action provision has been a 
challenging process. One court described the mass action provisions as 
“an opaque, baroque maze of interlocking cross-references that defy 
easy interpretation.”18 Another called the provisions a “Gordian knot.”19 
Still another stated simply, “CAFA as a whole, and the mass action 
provision in particular, is confusing.”20 
For their part, litigants—both plaintiffs and defendants—are litigating 
9. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11) (2012), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
10. However, mass actions are not subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—namely Rule 
23—that govern class actions. See Rudy Perrino, How CAFA Expands Federal Jurisdiction to 
Include Certain Mass Actions, in THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT: LAW AND STRATEGY 202 
(Gregory C. Cook ed., 2013). 
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11) (2012). 
12. See id.  
13. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). 
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11). 
15. See, e.g., Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, 749 F.3d 879, 885 (10th Cir. 2014); In re Abbott 
Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 570 (7th Cir. 2012); Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 952 (9th 
Cir. 2009). 
16. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:24 (5th ed. 
2013) [hereinafter NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS].  
17. See, e.g., Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014); 
Corber v. Xanodyne Pharm., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).  
18. Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1198 (11th Cir. 2007). 
19. Lowery v. Honeywell Intern., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1293 (N.D. Ala. 2006). 
20. Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1314 (M.D. Fla. 2008). 
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to test the boundaries of federal court jurisdiction over mass actions. 
Plaintiffs have attempted to keep their suits in state court by structuring 
them to avoid CAFA’s federal jurisdiction triggers.21 Defendants have 
removed to federal court on novel theories. For example, they have 
argued that the number of real parties in interest meets the 100-plaintiff 
threshold that CAFA requires22 and that a bellwether trial is in effect a 
“joint trial.”23 In 2013, the Supreme Court decided Standard Fire 
Insurance Co. v. Knowles,24 which demonstrates the gamesmanship 
CAFA in general has engendered. A class action plaintiff in state court 
stipulated that the putative class would not seek damages above 
$5 million.25 In doing so, he sought to avoid CAFA’s $5 million 
amount-in-controversy threshold.26 The district court found that 
damages would have exceeded that amount but for the putative class 
member’s stipulation, but that because damages were below the 
threshold, there could be no federal court jurisdiction over the action.27 
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that a plaintiff could not stipulate 
to any limit on the amount of damages it would pursue when there was a 
putative class because there was no class yet that could be legally 
bound.28 Thus, the contours of CAFA jurisdiction—including under the 
mass action provision—are still being worked out in the federal courts. 
It is against this backdrop that this Comment takes up CAFA’s less 
well-understood mass action provision. Litigants have zeroed in on what 
constitutes a proposal for a joint trial of common legal and factual issues 
21. See, e.g., In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 572 (7th Cir. 2012) (describing plaintiffs’ 
argument that using a bellwether trial would serve only to coordinate the cases for pre-trial 
purposes, not to fully adjudicate the issues and thereby circumvent federal court jurisdiction under 
CAFA). 
Note that plaintiffs’ attempts to avoid CAFA jurisdiction are consistent with the more general 
concept of forum-shopping, which occurs at the outset of every suit when the plaintiff chooses the 
initial forum. See Antony L. Ryan, Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 167, 168–69 
(2000) (“The plaintiff’s privilege [of forum selection] is so ingrained in our jurisprudence, and so 
rarely challenged on its own terms, that it is seldom discussed.”). What is particularly interesting 
about the CAFA context is that courts and litigants are adjudicating what kind of gamesmanship is 
permissible under this relatively new statute. 
22. See, e.g., AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 739 (deciding whether parens patriae suits by 
definition meet CAFA’s mass action requirements). 
23. In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d at 572–73. 
24. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013). 
25. Id. at 1347. 
26. Id. at 1347, 1350.  
27. Id. at 1348.  
28. Id. at 1348–50.  
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in the last several years,29 and thus when a federal court has jurisdiction 
over a mass action. But the questions raised by the mass action provision 
do not only concern procedural matters. The questions also implicate 
fundamental values in our judicial system: the boundaries of power 
between the state and federal courts;30 the relationship between 
plaintiffs, who are the masters of their complaints;31 and the rights of 
defendants, who may have a statutory right to have their cases heard in 
federal court.32 
This Comment addresses two fundamental problems that have 
emerged when federal courts have construed their jurisdiction under 
CAFA’s mass action provision: (1) that there is no coherent 
interpretation of what it means to propose that multiple cases “be tried 
jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common 
questions of law or fact,”33 and (2) that there is no principled framework 
for analyzing subject matter jurisdiction in a mass action case. Because 
the federal courts have not been consistent, there have been real 
consequences for litigants, as well as for the balance of power between 
state and federal courts. Thus, this Comment proposes solutions to both 
of these problems. This Comment builds on existing case law to put 
forth a coherent definition for what constitutes a proposal for a joint 
trial—the part of the mass action provision subject to much debate.34 It 
then proposes a framework for federal courts to determine their subject 
matter jurisdiction when faced with a purported mass action. 
Parts I through III provide necessary background to the interpretive 
issues that have arisen in mass action cases in federal court. Part I briefly 
traces the history of class action adjudication, discussing the limits that 
the Supreme Court imposed on the device in the late 1990s.35 Part II 
29. See, e.g., Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, 749 F.3d 879, 885 (10th Cir. 2014); In re Abbott 
Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 570 (7th Cir. 2012); Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 U.S. 945, 952 (9th 
Cir. 2009). 
30. Federalism is defined as “[t]he legal relationship and distribution of power between the 
national and regional governments within a federal system of government.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 687 (9th ed. 2009). 
31. See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002) 
(“[P]laintiff is ‘the master of the complaint . . . .’” (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 483 U.S. 
386, 398–99 (1987))). 
32. See 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3641 (3d ed. 
2008) (discussing how a defendant may statutorily remove a case from state court to federal court, 
even though the state court is the plaintiff’s preferred forum). 
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(1) (2012). 
34. See, e.g., Parson, 749 F.3d at 887–89 (construing the statute’s joint proposal language); In re 
Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d at 572–73 (same); Tanoh, 561 U.S. at 953 (same).  
35. See generally, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Ortiz v. 
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then addresses why litigation that merely resembled a class action 
became a political target and what Congress sought to achieve in passing 
CAFA. It particularly focuses on Congress’ view of state courts in the 
run-up to CAFA’s passage and why that led Congress to include mass 
actions in the statute. It also discusses at length CAFA’s mass action 
provision.36 Part III discusses underlying assumptions of federal court 
subject matter jurisdiction, including the federal courts’ willingness to 
go beyond pleadings and investigate their jurisdiction,37 using fraudulent 
joinder as an example. This Part provides useful context for 
understanding how some federal courts have deviated in the mass action 
context from their standard approach to construing subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
Part IV reconciles the primary mass action decisions in the federal 
courts, concluding that the courts have developed two interpretive 
approaches: one that facilitates an expansive grant of federal court 
jurisdiction in mass action cases, and one that facilitates a narrow grant 
of jurisdiction. The approach that a court uses is important because it 
determines as a threshold matter whether a group of state court cases is a 
mass action and thus whether a federal forum is available to the litigants. 
This Part argues that neither approach is completely reconcilable with 
how federal courts interpret their diversity jurisdiction in other contexts, 
and argues that bringing coherence to this area of law would benefit both 
litigants and courts. It concludes by asserting that the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Mississippi ex rel Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.,38 
although it squarely addresses CAFA’s mass action provision, does not 
much affect mass action litigation beyond parens patriae39 suits. 
Part V proposes a framework that the federal courts should employ in 
construing their subject matter jurisdiction in mass action cases. It 
argues that this framework is contemplated by CAFA itself, and, in any 
case, adheres to traditional principles in subject matter jurisdiction 
doctrine and affords due deference to state courts. It calls for federal 
courts—on their own motion if necessary—to require factual evidence 
of removal jurisdiction if the parties themselves do not provide it, and 
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11). 
37. See, e.g., In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 07-md-1871, MDL 
No. 1871, 2014 WL 2011597, at *1 (E.D. Penn. May 15, 2014). 
38. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 736, 741 (2014). 
39. Parens patriae is a “doctrine by which a government has standing to prosecute a lawsuit on 
behalf of a citizen, esp. on behalf of someone who is under a legal disability to prosecute the suit.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009). 
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the evidence is not apparent from the face of the parties’ pleadings that 
the federal court lacks jurisdiction. When assessing the factual evidence, 
the federal court should give the same effect to the underlying state court 
procedural motion that the state court would because existing CAFA 
case law supports it and federalism requires it. This Comment further 
grounds the proposed approach in traditional judicial principles in the 
subject matter jurisdiction context. 
I. CAFA: CLASS AND MASS ACTIONS 
CAFA’s mass action provision concerns the federal courts’ ability to 
hear state court suits.40 But this jurisdictional question is not just about 
the courts’ power. Rather, it is animated by the seemingly unfair results 
that arise from using class action-like litigation to solve large-scale 
problems.41 This Part discusses the development of class actions in 
federal courts before turning to CAFA and the new procedural mass 
action device that the statute created. The historical background provides 
context for understanding why litigation that resembled class actions—
what became known as “mass actions”—became a political target. 
A. Class Actions in Federal Court 
In a legal system premised on individual rights,42 class actions, and 
litigation that produces similar effects, are an anomaly. They are an 
exception to the principle “that one is not bound by a judgment in 
personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to 
which he has not been made a party by service of process.”43 The law 
40. CAFA is a jurisdictional statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). 
41. See, e.g., discussion of Amchem and Ortiz infra in Part I.A. 
42. See, e.g., Tatsuo Inoue, The Poverty of Rights-Blind Communality: Looking Through the 
Window of Japan, 1993 BYU L. REV. 517, 521 (1993) (“Individual liberties and freedoms have 
become the over-arching concern of the American legal system.”); Frank J. Macchiarola, Finding 
the Truth in an American Criminal Trial: Some Observations, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 
97, 111 (1997) (noting “[t]he tendency of our American legal system to see rights in . . . individual 
terms”); David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Progressive Social Thought, 74 TEX. L. REV. 951, 980 
(1996) (discussing First Amendment legal philosophy in the context of the “American legal system” 
and its “constitutional system of individual rights”). 
43. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940); see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884 
(2008) (quoting Hansberry for proposition that “[i]t is a principle of general application in Anglo–
American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he 
is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process”); Ortiz 
v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 818 (1999) (citing Hansberry for the same proposition); 
Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 795 (1996) (“In Hansberry v. Lee, we held that it 
would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to bind litigants to a judgment 
 
                                                     
 
15 - Gitt_ Final Author Review_Approved 03.19.15.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/13/2015  11:57 AM 
2015] REMOVAL JURISDICTION OVER MASS ACTIONS 459 
therefore “treats class actions as justified only in limited 
circumstances.”44 It does so with good reason because class actions 
create a number of tensions: between named and unnamed class 
members;45 between class members and class counsel;46 and between 
courts and litigants.47 
The 1966 makeover of Rule 2348 expanded the scope of class actions 
and made them readily available to plaintiffs seeking monetary 
damages.49 When the Rules Committee promulgated the new rule, 
commentators noted that class action devices were ill-suited to solving 
complex problems like those that arise in mass tort suits.50 Despite this 
seeming limit, class action use expanded throughout the late 1960s and 
1970s as parties employed class actions to litigate consumer products 
liability cases and other mass torts.51 As the device evolved, class 
actions and aggregate litigation more generally were employed in a 
rendered in an earlier litigation to which they were not parties and in which they were not 
adequately represented.” (internal citation omitted)); 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 
16, § 1.1 (quoting Hansberry for the proposition that “one is not bound by a judgment in personam 
in a litigation in which he has not been made a party by service of process”). 
44. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 795 (10th ed. 2009). 
45. See 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 16, § 9.1 (describing the expectation that an 
absent class member will sit back and do nothing, while the named party represents the interests of 
the entire class). Indeed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4) requires as a prerequisite that the 
representative parties fairly and adequately represent the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (“(a) One or 
more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only 
if: . . . (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”). 
46. Class counsel may collude with the represented parties or the defendant, for example, in a 
way that undermines the unnamed class members’ interests. See, e.g., In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. 
Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that class counsel would have received 
$800,000 in putative class settlement, while unnamed parties would have received nothing and 
defendants would have contributed only $100,000 under the cy pres doctrine to a newly created 
charity). 
47. The court is tasked with protecting the interests of the unnamed class members, which may 
put it at odds with the litigants who may prefer a different outcome, for example, a universal 
settlement sought by both the named parties and the defendant. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985) (“Unlike a defendant in a civil suit, a class-action plaintiff is not 
required to fend for himself. The court and named plaintiffs protect his interests.” (emphasis added) 
(internal citation omitted))). 
48. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory’s committee’s note to 1966 amendment. 
49. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 357–58 (1967); Scott L. Nelson, CAFA in the 
Congress: The Eight-Year Struggle, in THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT: LAW AND STRATEGY, 
supra note 10, at 24. 
50. David Marcus, Erie, the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of 
Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1252 (2007). 
51. David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang 1953–
1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 609–14 (2013). 
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range of cases never contemplated.52 Indeed, aggregate litigation became 
a regulatory tool when captured government agencies53 would not or 
could not act,54 particularly in consumer protection, securities, antitrust, 
and employment discrimination cases.55 As it did, the tensions inherent 
in aggregate litigation intensified and led to congressional and executive 
attempts to rewrite and cabin Rule 23 throughout the 1970s.56 Business 
lobbyists weighed in during this time, arguing that class actions were a 
“grave economic hazard to business,”57 which foreshadowed later 
arguments in the lead-up to CAFA’s passage.58 These efforts were 
largely unsuccessful, however, and class action law occupied an almost 
extra-regulatory space throughout this period.59 
But in the late 1990s, in two class action settlement cases, the 
Supreme Court first signaled that there were significant concerns with 
expansively using class action litigation.60 A class action settlement “is a 
judicially crafted procedure”61 and “is intended not to litigate contested 
issues but to implement a settlement.”62 And usually the parties “agree 
to settle . . . before the class certification decision is made.”63 In the late 
1990s, the Supreme Court determined that the mass tort settlements that 
came before it in Amchem Products v. Windsor64 and Ortiz v. 
52. See id. at 592–94. 
53. Capture of a regulatory agency “occurs when a regulator becomes too closely connected with 
the industry that is to be regulated.” CCH International Encyclopaedia of Laws: Cyber Law § 2, 
2013 WL 4296521 (C.C.H.) (2012). 
54. Marcus, supra note 51, at 592–93.  
55. Id. at 627–39.  
56. Id. at 611–12. 
57. Id. (quoting Hearings on S. 2246, S. 3092, S. 3201 Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the S. 
Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d. Sess. iii (1970)). 
58. See Nelson, supra note 49, at 40–42.  
59. See Marcus, supra note 51, at 610–12. 
60. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620–21, 627 (1997) (“[S]pecifications of 
[Rule 23]—those designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class 
definitions demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement context. Such attention is 
of vital importance, for a court asked to certify a settlement class will lack the opportunity, present 
when a case is litigated, to adjust the class, informed by the proceedings as they unfold.”); Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (“We hold that applicants for contested certification on 
[a FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B)] rationale must show that the fund is limited by more than the 
agreement of the parties, and has been allocated to claimants belonging within the class by a process 
addressing any conflicting interests of class members.”). 
61. In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 778 (3d Cir. 1995). 
62. JAY TIDMARSH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE CASE 
STUDIES 19 (1998). 
63. Id. at 20. 
64. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 629. 
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Fibreboard Corp.65 violated due process principles. In both cases, the 
plaintiff classes sought to remedy a nationwide problem that Congress 
had not acted to fix—millions of people who had developed asbestos-
related injuries during their careers.66 The settlements that came before 
the Court were the culmination of decades of litigation: “plaintiffs’ 
lawyers” had “honed the litigation of asbestos claims to the point of 
almost mechanical regularity.”67 But the proposed mass settlements 
troubled the Court because they did not provide an adequate recovery to 
many people affected by asbestos.68 The procedural devices were not 
adequately constructed to provide sufficient relief and to protect absent 
class members.69 
In Amchem, a plaintiff class sought settlement certification to 
“achieve global settlement of current and future asbestos-related 
claims.”70 It contained a “complex agreement designed to compensate 
certain types of asbestos injuries in a predictable fashion.”71 The 
Supreme Court, however, was concerned the settlement did not 
adequately compensate the plaintiff class.72 The class would have been 
bound by the settlement forever, while the defendants could withdraw 
after ten years.73 And only a small number of class members could reject 
the settlement and pursue individual claims; even these plaintiffs, 
however, could not recover punitive damages.74 In addition, the funding 
mechanism for the settlement did not account for inflation or for costs of 
65. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 865. 
66. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 597 (“The settlement-class certification we confront evolved in 
response to an asbestos-litigation crisis.”); Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821 (“Like Amchem Products, Inc. v. 
Windsor, this case is a class action prompted by the elephantine mass of asbestos cases . . . .” 
(internal citation omitted)). 
67. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 822. 
68. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627 (“The settling parties, in sum, achieved a global compromise with 
no structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the diverse groups and individuals 
affected.”); Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 842 (“[T]he greater the leniency in departing from the historical 
limited fund model, the greater the likelihood of abuse.”). 
69. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627 (“[T]he terms of the settlement reflect essential allocation 
decisions designed to confine compensation and to limit defendants’ liability.”); Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 
842 (“[T]he greater the leniency in departing from the historical limited fund model, the greater the 
likelihood of abuse . . . .”). 
70. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 597. 
71. TIDMARSH, supra note 62, at 51. 
72. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 604 (“Class members are to receive no compensation for certain kinds 
of claims, even if otherwise applicable state law recognizes such claims.”). 
73. Id. at 604–05 (“Class members, in the main, are bound by the settlement in perpetuity, 
while . . . defendants may choose to withdraw from the settlement after ten years.”). 
74. Id. at 627 (describing how “only a few claimants per year can opt out at the back end”). 
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advancing medical treatment.75 Although the Court rejected the 
settlement because of these concerns, it noted, “the text of the Rule does 
not categorically exclude mass tort cases from class certification.”76 It 
did, however, establish that there were significant hurdles to overcome 
before certification for settlement purposes.77 
Similarly, in Ortiz, the parties sought to certify a class-wide 
settlement as a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund78 to deal with “the 
elephantine mass of asbestos cases.”79 The Court held that the parties 
could not show that the proposed fund was actually limited by the 
company’s financial circumstances, rather than merely by what the 
company was willing to pay to settle the claims.80 The Court also found 
that the parties had not shown that the class members would be treated 
equitably in the distribution of the fund.81 These deficiencies meant the 
settlement could not proceed and, more importantly, raised questions 
about whether the device could ever be used to settle similar claims.82 
This pair of cases emphatically shows that by the late 1990s there 
were limits to the problems aggregate litigation could be used to solve.83 
75. Id. at 626 (“[N]amed parties with diverse medical conditions sought to act on behalf of a 
single giant class rather than on behalf of discrete subclasses. In significant respects, the interests of 
those within the single class are not aligned.”). 
76. Id. at 625. 
77. The hurdles include ensuring adequate provision for future claimants who might have latent 
diseases or perhaps allowing class members bound by the settlement to seek relief in court later in 
some instances, for example. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620–21, 627. 
78. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B) (“A 
class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: (1) prosecuting separate actions by 
or against individual class members would create a risk of: (B) adjudications with respect to 
individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other 
members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their 
ability to protect their interests.”). 
79. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821. 
80. Id. at 860 (“With Fibreboard retaining nearly all its net worth, it hardly appears that such a 
regime is the best that can be provided for class members.”).  
81. Id. at 848 (“[The proposed settlement] showed . . . allocations of assets at odds with the 
concept of limited fund treatment and the structural protections of Rule 23(a) explained in 
Amchem.”).  
82. Id. at 821 (“We hold that applicants for contested certification on [a FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(b)(1)(B)] rationale must show that the fund is limited by more than the agreement of the parties, 
and has been allocated to claimants belonging within the class by a process addressing any 
conflicting interests of class members.”). 
83. At the time Amchem was being decided, the Standing Committee of the Rules of Practice and 
Procedure had proposed that Rule 23 be changed to “allow[] certification of settlement classes more 
easily than litigation classes.” HAZARD ET AL., supra note 44, at 879. But given the Court’s 
decisions in Amchem and Ortiz, the proposed rule change died in the Committee. Id. (“The 
Proposed Rule died in the wake of Amchem and Ortiz.”). 
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In both cases, the Court found that the litigation “defie[d] customary 
judicial administration and call[ed] for national legislation,”84 even 
though Congress had failed to act after over thirty years of asbestos-
related litigation.85 When Congress also addressed class action reform 
during this time, the judiciary had signaled its own discomfort with 
aggregate litigation. 
B. Congress Turns to Class Action (and Class Action-Like) Litigation 
As the Supreme Court placed limits on settlements in class action 
practice in the mid- to late-1990s, Congress also targeted class action 
(and class action-like) litigation more generally. In the infamous Bank of 
Boston suit in the mid-1990s, at least one member of a class action 
settlement was charged a $91.33 “miscellaneous deduction” for attorney 
fees from his escrow account without his knowledge in exchange for a 
$2.19 recovery as a member of the class.86 Class counsel received 
$8.5 million in costs and fees.87 An Alabama state court judge approved 
the settlement.88 The case demonstrated what many people already 
thought of class actions: that they were egregiously unfair to both 
plaintiffs and defendants.89 Class counsel earned a windfall at the 
84. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821. 
85. Id. (noting that the first suit for “personal asbestos injury” was filed in federal court in 1967). 
86. See Barry Meier, Math of a Class-Action Suit: ‘Winning’ $2.19 Costs $91.33, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 21, 1995, at D6; Kamilewicz v. Bank of Bos. Corp., 100 F.3d 1348 (7th Cir. 1996) (underlying 
suit at issue). The absent class members in the original suit who had recovered little or had to pay 
out-of-pocket more than their recovery was worth, filed their own class action, alleging that the 
earlier suit had led to fraud. Meier, supra, at D6. 
87. Meier, supra note 86, at D6. 
88. Id. 
89. See, e.g., Robert Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 731 
(2013) (“The class action device, once considered a ‘revolutionary’ vehicle for achieving mass 
justice, has fallen into disfavor. Numerous courts have become skeptical about certifying class 
actions. Some have emphasized the pressures on defendants to settle after class certification is 
granted . . . .”); Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. 
REV. 65, 76 (2003) (noting the “occasional instances of egregious corruption on the part of 
attorneys who take advantage of class members and a perception that consumer class actions are not 
a public good, but a money making scheme for unscrupulous lawyers”); Francis E. McGovern, 
Class Actions and Social Issue Torts in the Gulf South, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1655, 1659 (2000) (“[T]he 
combination of a proplaintiff environment with ample actionable torts and the advent of 
entrepreneurial litigation in the hands of a well-funded, risk-taking plaintiffs’ bar have combined to 
create a favorable class action chemistry in the Gulf South.”). But see Willy E. Rice, Allegedly 
“Biased,” “Intimidating,” and “Incompetent” State Court Judges and the Questionable Removal of 
State Law Class Actions to Purportedly “Impartial” and “Competent” Federal Courts—A 
Historical Perspective and an Empirical Analysis of Class Action Dispositions in Federal and State 
Courts: 1925–2011, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 419, 458 (2012) (“[A]buse of judicial discretion 
is arguably the most egregious risk that defendants will face when defending against class 
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expense of unsuspecting class members, and provided little benefit to the 
class members.90 This case in particular contributed to a political 
environment hostile to aggregate litigation.91 
1. Congress Introduces CAFA 
Congress first introduced CAFA in 1997.92 Because the bill was 
spurred in part by the Bank of Boston case,93 the original bill was 
concerned primarily with class action settlements, and its proposed 
changes would have altered at the margins the processes for adjudicating 
those settlements.94 Legislation was necessary because, according to 
Congress, an out-of-control system of class action litigation had led to 
unfair results for unnamed parties,95 significant and unwarranted 
financial loss for defendants,96 and large payouts to greedy plaintiffs’ 
attorneys.97 Class actions caused “irreparable injury” and “collusive” 
settlements,98 and they “failed to benefit class members while enriching 
attorneys.”99 
Members of Congress believed that state courts had enabled the 
problem. After the 1966 enactment of Rule 23, class action litigation 
expanded in state courts100 as those courts followed the spirit of the new, 
expansive federal rule.101 In doing so, state courts kept “cases of national 
importance out of Federal court,” showed “bias against out-of-State 
defendants,” and made “judgments that impose[d] their view of the law 
on other States and [bound] the rights of the residents of those States.”102 
State courts also applied their governing rules “inconsistently” and 
actions.”). 
90. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Study Shows Consumer Class-Action Lawyers Earn Millions, Clients 
Little, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2013, 8:46 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/12/11/ 
with-consumer-class-actions-lawyers-are-mostly-paid-to-do-nothing/. 
91. See Nelson, supra note 49, at 27.  
92. Id. at 26.  
93. Id. at 27.  
94. Id. (“[T]his earliest iteration of CAFA was limited in scope and contained none of the 
jurisdictional provisions that eventually became CAFA’s primary legislative battleground.”).  
95. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 5. 
96. Id. 
97. Id.  
98. Nelson, supra note 49, at 33 (quoting H. REP. NO. 105-702, at 6 (1998)).  
99. Id. at 40. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 24. 
102. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 119 Stat. at 5. 
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“inadequate[ly] supervis[ed]”103 class actions. Some states had become 
“magnet jurisdictions,” where plaintiffs and their attorneys flocked for 
favorable class action treatment.104 
In addition to the favorable environment state courts created for 
plaintiffs, stringent diversity jurisdiction rules kept many suits in state 
court.105 “[P]laintiffs who wished to avoid removal to a federal 
court . . . had only to choose at least one named class representative who 
was a citizen of the same state as a defendant, or add one defendant that 
was a citizen of the same state as the named class representatives.”106 
These suits would then stay in state court where they were more likely to 
be certified107 and result in a plaintiff-friendly (and plaintiff attorney-
friendly) outcome.108 
The 1997 version of CAFA did not contain any jurisdictional 
provision.109 But, in short order, members of Congress sought larger-
scale reform of class actions. By 1998, “the idea of expanding federal 
jurisdiction over class actions had already obtained at least a measure of 
bipartisan support.”110 The jurisdictional changes gained further traction 
as Congress came to specifically view states as enabling abusive class 
action litigation.111 
CAFA’s supporters wanted class actions litigated in a forum that 
would be more skeptical of frivolous claims and more reluctant to certify 
consumer classes than state courts were.112 Interest groups in particular 
urged Congress to limit the state courts’ use of aggregate litigation for 
these reasons. For example, the Manhattan Institute, a research group 
103. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5 (2005). 
104. Id. 
105. Before CAFA, litigants in federal court had to demonstrate complete diversity. See Cameron 
Fredman, Plaintiffs’ Paradise Lost: Diversity of Citizenship and Amount in Controversy Under the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV., 1025, 1031 (2006). Complete diversity 
was difficult to meet in such cases because “jurisdiction-defeating tactics [we]re generally 
effective.” Id. 
106. Nelson, supra note 49, at 25. 
107. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5. 
108. Id. at 13. 
109. Nelson, supra note 49, at 27.  
110. Id. at 28. 
111. Id. at 29–57 (detailing the eight-year evolution of CAFA in Congress prior to its passage).  
112. See, e.g., John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They’re Making A Federal Case Out 
of It . . . In State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 145–46 (2001); AM. TORT REFORM 
ASS’N, BRINGING JUSTICE TO JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2002 (2002), available at 
www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/JH2002.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL 
HELLHOLES 2002]. 
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that promotes “economic choice and individual responsibility,”113 
commissioned a 2001 article calling for federalization of certain state 
court litigation, based on the experiences of three counties in Florida, 
Illinois, and Texas.114 The article boldly claimed that state court judges 
more often sided with plaintiffs because they received reelection 
contributions from members of the local bar.115 
The American Tort Reform Association also joined in with its own 
report—Bringing Justice to Judicial Hellholes 2002.116 A “judicial 
hellhole” was a jurisdiction perceived as favorable to plaintiffs, and 
therefore “attract[ed] lawsuits from around the nation.”117 It relied on 
incendiary anecdotes from trial lawyers and state court judges in making 
its case that state courts unfairly certified and adjudicated class 
actions.118 It quoted one trial lawyer as saying that certain jurisdictions 
were “magic jurisdictions” “where what happens in court is irrelevant 
because the jury will return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.”119 In its 
2003 update to this report, the Association quoted a West Virginia State 
Supreme Court Justice as saying, “As long as I am allowed to 
redistribute wealth from out-of-state companies to injured in-state 
plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced when 
I give someone else’s money away, but so is my job security.”120 The 
United States Chamber of Commerce also urged Congress to reform 
class actions several times from when CAFA was introduced until it was 
passed.121 The pressure from interest groups helped CAFA’s primary 
113. About Manhattan Institute, MANHATTAN INST., http://www.manhattan-institute.org/about/ 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2014).  
114. Beisner & Miller, supra note 112, at 159. 
115. Id. at 205.  
116. JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2002, supra note 112. A similar report has been published every year 
since 2002. See Report Archives, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES, http://www.judicialhellholes.org/archives/ 
(last visited Dec. 28, 2014). 
117. JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2002, supra note 112, at 2. 
118. Id. at 3–5. 
119. Id. at 3. 
120. AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, BRINGING JUSTICE TO JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2003, at ix (2003), 
available at www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/JH2003.pdf.  
121.  See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Chamber of Commerce Endorses 
House Action on Class Action Reform (Sept. 22, 1999), available at 
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/chamber-of-commerce-endorses-house-action-on-class-
action-reform/; Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Chamber Applauds Sen. Lincoln’s Co-
Sponsorship of Class Action Bill (Apr. 10, 2003), available at www.instituteforlegalreform.com/ 
resource/chamber-applauds-sen-lincolns-co-sponsorship-of-class-action-bill/; Gretchen Morgenson 
& Glen Justice, Taking Care of Business, His Way, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2005, at BU1 (mentioning 
the president and CEO of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s role in CAFA’s passage). 
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supporters in Congress to push for its passage with expanded federal 
jurisdiction. 
Mass actions were added to CAFA to address state court abuses of 
class action-like litigation.122 They were not part of the earliest versions 
of CAFA, only appearing in the proposed legislation in 2001.123 At that 
point, mass actions were styled as “private attorney-general actions in 
which individuals seek relief on behalf of others.”124 Commentators note 
that “Congress’ intent [in including the mass action provision] appears to 
have been to bring under CAFA large actions in states that do not have 
specific class action statutes.”125 The Senate Committee Report stated 
that neither Mississippi nor West Virginia at the time had “rules or 
statutes authorizing class actions.”126 
With these two drastic additions—expanded jurisdiction and the 
federalization of state court suits that may have the same effect as class 
action suits—detractors of aggregate litigation were poised to enact 
sweeping change. 
2. Congress Passes CAFA 
After attempting to legislate class action reform for eight years in a 
row,127 Congress passed CAFA in 2005.128 The statute provided an 
avenue for more state court suits of “national importance”129 to be 
adjudicated in federal court.130 It did so by greatly relaxing the 
requirements for original diversity jurisdiction131 and removal from state 
court to federal court.132 
In giving federal courts control over more aggregate litigation, 
122. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5 (2005). Some argue, however, that many state court practices that 
were abusive of the class action device had already been reformed by the time CAFA passed. See 
Sue-Yun Ahn, CAFA, Choice-of-Law, and the Problem of Legal Maturity in Nationwide Class 
Actions, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 105, 116 (2007) (“Whether from external pressure or internal reform, by 
the time CAFA was enacted, many of the more egregious examples of class action abuse in state 
courts had been addressed to some extent by the states themselves.” (footnote omitted)). 
123. Nelson, supra note 49, at 42. 
124. Id. (footnote omitted). 
125. 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 16, § 6:24.  
126. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 13–14. 
127. Nelson, supra note 49, at 23.  
128. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012).  
129. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 5. 
130. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11) (2012). 
131. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). 
132. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1441.  
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Congress had three primary goals: “[1] to assure fair and prompt 
recoveries for class members with legitimate claims; [2] to restore the 
intent of the Framers by expanding federal jurisdiction over inter-state 
class actions; and [3] to benefit society by encouraging innovation and 
lowering consumer prices.”133 To accomplish these goals, CAFA 
expanded federal jurisdiction over class actions, as well as mass 
actions—a new kind of device encompassing litigation not previously 
subject to federal court jurisdiction.134 
The statute fundamentally changed how diversity jurisdiction 
operates. Before CAFA, the party seeking federal jurisdiction in a 
diversity class action (whether a named plaintiff or a removing 
defendant) had to establish a claim for each plaintiff in excess of 
$75,000 and the existence of complete diversity among all parties.135 
These previous requirements created a high barrier for entering federal 
court. Under CAFA, however, a class action may be adjudicated in 
federal court if the parties are minimally diverse,136 the amount in 
controversy is in excess of $5 million when all claims are aggregated,137 
and there are 100 or more plaintiffs.138 
In addition, a defendant seeking to remove a case from state to federal 
court is not subject to the usual—more strict—rules of removal.139 
CAFA relaxes the traditional removal rules140 for aggregate litigation in 
four key ways: (1) it removes a suit from being subject to the one-year 
limitation in the general removal statute;141 (2) it requires only one 
defendant to agree to removal;142 (3) it allows a defendant to appeal a 
133. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 30 (2005). 
134. See, e.g., Mississippi. ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 736, 744 
(2014) (describing the mass action’s role in the CAFA statutory scheme as a “backstop” that aids in 
effectuating Congress’ “overriding concern” with class actions). 
135. See 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 16, § 6:6 (“The general rule for class 
actions is th[at] each class member’s claim must independently meet the amount in controversy 
requirement. This makes it difficult to maintain diversity class actions in federal court as class 
action cases are typically comprised of small claims.”). 
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)–(C) (2012). Minimal diversity only requires that one plaintiff and 
one defendant are diverse from each other, see 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 16, 
§ 6:6, in contrast to complete diversity, which in the class action context had required that every 
class representative be diverse from every defendant, see id. § 6:7. 
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 
138. Id. § 1332(d)(5)(B). 
139. See, e.g., 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 16, § 6:15. 
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441. 
141. Id. § 1453(b). 
142. Id. 
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remand order;143 and (4) it allows a defendant to remove even if he is a 
citizen of the state in which the case was filed.144 The new rules 
dramatically skew jurisdiction in favor of federal courts, enabling the 
forum perceived to be more cautious about certifying and adjudicating 
class actions145 to take the reins. 
Federal court doors, therefore, have been thrown wide open to 
aggregate litigation that operates like class actions. And, as a result, 
“class actions are now more regularly filed in Federal court and 
defendants can now more easily remove” mass actions “from State to 
Federal court.”146 After CAFA’s passage, even its detractors in Congress 
agree the statute has been successful in achieving its primary aim: 
“Seven years later, CAFA certainly appears to have achieved its core 
goal of removing class [and mass] actions from State to Federal 
courts.”147 
II. MASS ACTIONS: “CLASS ACTIONS IN DISGUISE” 
CAFA also envelops state court litigation that otherwise would not be 
subject to federal court jurisdiction by creating a “backstop”148—the 
mass action provision. This backstop ensures that state court suits that 
may have the same effect as class actions cannot easily escape federal 
court jurisdiction. That is because “mass actions are simply class actions 
in disguise”149 and thus “often result in the same abuses as class 
actions.”150 
143. Id. § 1453(c). 
144. Id. § 1453(b). 
145. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5 (2005) (“Because interstate class actions typically involve more 
people, more money, and more interstate commerce ramifications than any other type of lawsuit, the 
Committee firmly believes that such cases properly belong in federal court.”). 
146. Class Actions Seven Years After the Class Action Fairness Act, Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2012) (statement of 
Rep. Franks, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
147. Id. at 3 (statement of Rep. Nadler, Ranking Member, Subcomm. on the Constitution of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
148. See Mississippi. ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 736, 744 (2014) 
(describing the mass action provision as a “backstop” that prevents litigation that resembles a class 
action from escaping federal court jurisdiction).  
149. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 47. 
150. Id. at 46–47. 
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A. Creating a Mass Action 
Mass actions simply did not exist before CAFA151 because their 
underlying substance is rooted in state court procedure. A mass action 
starts out in state court as multiple suits that involve the same subject 
matter.152 Sometimes the same attorneys represent different groups of 
plaintiffs that eventually end up coming together in the mass action. 
Similarly, the multiple suits are often against the same defendant. In 
state court, the plaintiffs or the court may move to consolidate the cases 
for various purposes before and during trial. At this point—when a state 
procedural mechanism joins the actions—they may become a mass 
action (assuming the suit meets CAFA’s other statutory provisions, 
described infra in Part II.A.). Unlike class actions, mass actions need not 
have been initiated as representative suits and are not subject to the 
rigorous requirements of Rule 23 once removed to federal court.153 Thus, 
mass actions are unique because they are wholly created from federal 
statute. 
Under the mass action provisions, CAFA allows a defendant to 
remove state court suits that involve 100 or more plaintiffs’ claims for 
monetary relief when the plaintiffs propose that the cases be tried 
jointly.154 In addition to a proposal for joint trial that brings together at 
least 100 plaintiffs,155 every plaintiff in a mass action must have a claim 
in excess of $75,000,156 and the amount of the claims as a whole must be 
151. See, e.g., Gregory C. Cook & Jocelyn D. Larkin, Introduction and Overview, in THE CLASS 
ACTION FAIRNESS ACT: LAW & STRATEGY, supra note 10, at 11 (calling mass actions “the new 
vehicle” for aggregate adjudication).  
152. See, e.g., Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, 749 F.3d 879, 885 (10th Cir. 2014) (“The 
controversy before us began when 702 plaintiffs from 26 different states and the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico filed twelve nearly identical product liability actions against the defendants in the 
District Court of Pottawatomie County, Oklahoma.”); In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 570 
(7th Cir. 2012) (“Between August 2010 and November 2011 several hundred plaintiffs filed ten 
lawsuits in Illinois state court . . . .”). 
153. Perrino, supra note 10, at 202. 
154. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11) (2012). 
155. Id. 
156. See, e.g., AU Optronics Corp. v. South Carolina, 699 U.S. 385, 390 (4th Cir. 2012); Lowery 
v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1203–05 (11th Cir. 2007); Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 
443 F.3d 676, 678 (9th Cir. 2006). CAFA’s mass action provision thus preserves one of the 
elements of pre-CAFA diversity jurisdiction—that each plaintiff must have an amount in 
controversy in excess of $75,000. For CAFA class actions, the amount in controversy is calculated 
solely by aggregation and no attention is paid to an individual plaintiff’s amount in controversy. 
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (“In any class action, the claims of the individual class members 
shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 
$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.”), with id. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (stating that “jurisdiction 
shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional amount 
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in excess of $5 million.157 CAFA also states that mass actions are 
defined as class actions for the purposes of removal,158 so the relaxed 
requirements for removal also apply to mass actions.159 
Although the mass action provisions’ requirements may seem 
straightforward, they are not. In particular, the requirement that plaintiffs 
propose a joint trial has created thorny interpretive challenges.160 Thus, 
this Comment explores infra the proposal as a triggering event that may 
confer federal court jurisdiction. 
B. Mass Confusion 
Federal courts have been unclear about how they will interpret the 
mass action provision when they construe their subject matter 
jurisdiction. Congress directed that CAFA’s principles, including those 
embodied in the mass action section, should be given broad expanse: 
“[T]he definition of ‘class action’ is to be interpreted liberally. Its 
application should not be confined solely to lawsuits that are labeled 
‘class actions’ . . . . Generally speaking, lawsuits that resemble a 
purported class action should be considered class actions for the purpose 
of applying these provisions.”161 Given that the Senate Report 
accompanying CAFA states that mass actions should be defined as class 
actions are elsewhere in the statute,162 Congress presumably intended 
federal courts to also apply this broad interpretation to mass actions. 
However, these broad statements leave open many questions, especially 
because they call for interpreting jurisdiction in a way at odds with how 
federal courts typically interpret their subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, 
the battle over the full extent of mass action jurisdiction has been trained 
requirements under subsection (a),” which requires an individual to demonstrate an amount in 
controversy in excess of $75,000).  
157. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6).  
158. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(A). 
159. Id. 
160. See, e.g., Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, 749 F.3d 879, 886 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(“[Defendants] . . . contended that jurisdiction was available under CAFA’s ‘mass action’ provision 
because . . . plaintiffs had proposed a joint trial of claims involving more than 100 plaintiffs.”); 
Corber v. Xanodyne Pharm., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“The parties 
dispute only whether Plaintiffs’ petitions for coordination constitute proposals for the cases ‘to be 
tried jointly’ under CAFA.”); In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 570 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The 
parties petition us to resolve two conflicting district court decisions and decide whether a motion to 
consolidate and transfer related state court cases to one circuit court through trial constitutes a 
proposal to try the cases jointly . . . .”). 
161. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 35 (2005). 
162. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(A). 
 
                                                     
15 - Gitt_ Final Author Review_Approved 03.19.15.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/13/2015  11:57 AM 
472 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:453 
on whether plaintiffs should be able to “game” the system by structuring 
state court suits to avoid federal jurisdiction.163 
Neither side has it quite right. Plaintiffs are not entitled in all respects 
to plead around federal court jurisdiction164 nor are defendants in all 
respects entitled to invoke a federal forum.165 The proper balance, 
however, is still in flux as different federal courts mark the boundaries 
differently.166 
Therefore, federal courts have struggled with interpreting the mass 
action provision, particularly in determining whether plaintiffs have 
proposed a joint trial and therefore created a mass action. Courts have 
used colorful language to illustrate their difficulty with this task. One 
court described the mass action provisions as “an opaque, baroque maze 
of interlocking cross-references that defy easy interpretation.”167 
Another called the provisions a “Gordian knot.”168 Still another stated 
simply, “CAFA as a whole, and the mass action provision in particular, 
is confusing.”169 The source of this confusion stems from the unclear 
language of the statutory triggering event—a proposal for joint trial of 
common law or fact170—and how broadly or narrowly federal courts 
should construe their jurisdiction.171 
Congress also recognizes that mass actions have created confusion for 
the courts.172 Congress recently noted that the mass action section of 
CAFA has led to unintended consequences because federal courts have 
163. See, e.g., Glenn J. Pogust & Michael L. Gruver, CAFA Mass Actions: Can Plaintiffs 
Continue to Game the System?, PRACTICAL L.J., Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014, at 57 (“In the years since 
CAFA’s enactment, plaintiffs’ attorneys wishing to avoid federal jurisdiction under CAFA have 
experimented with various approaches to keep their cases in potentially friendlier state courts.”). 
164. Defendants may also have a statutory right of removal. See, e.g., Eufaula Drugs, Inc. v. 
Tmesys, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1241 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (“One statutory right of removal 
provided to the defendant[ is] based on ‘complete’ diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction. . . . Another 
statutory right of removal exists under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. . . .” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
165. Defendants must demonstrate that there would have been federal court jurisdiction initially 
before invoking it on removal. See 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 16, § 6:15. 
166. Compare Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, 749 F.3d 879 (10th Cir. 2014), with In re Abbott 
Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 2012).  
167. Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1198 (11th Cir. 2007). 
168. Lowery v. Honeywell Intern., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1293 (N.D. Ala. 2006). 
169. Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1314 (M.D. Fla. 2008). 
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (2012). 
171. See, e.g., Parson, 749 F.3d at 887–89 (construing the statute’s joint proposal language); In 
re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d at 572–73 (same); Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 U.S. 945, 953 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (same). 
172. Class Actions Seven Years After the Class Action Fairness Act, supra note 146. 
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not uniformly applied its preferred broad interpretation.173 Litigants still 
try to game the system by forum-shopping in both state and federal 
court, and have been enabled to do so by a Circuit split.174 Specifically, 
Congress found that some federal courts have permitted “plaintiffs’ 
attorneys . . . to avoid CAFA’s requirements by splitting mass actions 
into groups of 99 or fewer plaintiffs to avoid CAFA’s requirement that 
mass actions with 100 or more plaintiffs be tried in Federal court.”175 
This has led to forum-shopping in the federal courts, rather than state 
courts,176 and demonstrates that federal law has not been uniformly 
applied as Congress intended.177 
C. Federalism Concerns 
In addition to creating confusion about how its language should be 
interpreted in the courts, the mass action provisions also implicate 
federalism concerns. Federalism is “the legal relationship and 
distribution of power between the national and [state] governments.”178 
Federalism may require a federal court to refrain from hearing a 
constitutional challenge to a state action if federal adjudication would be 
considered an improper intrusion into the state’s right to enforce its own 
laws in its own courts.179 Mass actions thus create questions about 
whether, as an empirical matter, federal and state courts are equally 
“fair” to litigants or are equally competent to adjudicate matters that 
come before them.180 Although Congress appears to have been aware of 
the federalism implications of CAFA by including carve-outs for cases 
173. Id. 
174. See id. (“One of the problems that has emerged since CAFA’s enactment is a new form of 
forum shopping. Whereas prior to CAFA plaintiffs’ attorneys filed suit in what were perceived to be 
the most favorable State courts, after CAFA it appears that attorneys are choosing to file class 
actions in certain Federal appeals circuits due to a favorable circuit precedent. This is a troubling 
trend considering that Federal law is supposed to be applied uniformly throughout the country.”).  
175. Id. 
176. Id.  
177. Id. 
178. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 687 (9th ed. 2009).  
179. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 723 (1996) (“Federal courts abstain out of 
deference to the paramount interests of another sovereign, and the concern is with principles of 
comity and federalism.”); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1049 (6th ed. 2009); Lynn N. Hughes, Floating Back 
& Forth with Federalism: Removal and Remand for Proctors, 18 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 803, 803 (1996) 
(“The friction of federalism is evident in the endless procedural haggling over which system of 
courts is the correct place for a suit.”). 
180. See, e.g., FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 179, at 278–83. 
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of truly local concern,181 the statute nonetheless profoundly reorganizes 
the balance of power between the federal government and state 
judiciaries.182 In doing so, Congress did not hide its belief that state 
courts were not up to the task of fairly and adequately adjudicating 
aggregate litigation in their courtrooms.183 
D. The Need for Clarity 
While the mass action provisions are less understood,184 they are 
increasingly relevant as litigants turn to them to define the limits of the 
statute’s jurisdiction. As commentators have noted, parties who seek to 
avoid federal court jurisdiction have attempted to limit the number of 
plaintiffs in a suit to stay below the numerosity threshold.185 And 
defendants continue to stretch the limits of the mass action definition to 
secure federal court jurisdiction.186 A series of Forbes articles, for 
example, discussed the different approaches to mass action jurisdiction 
that have emerged in the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.187 
One article noted that the key question was whether these courts were 
“willing to look beyond the . . . plaintiffs’ literal statements and actions, 
181. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) (2012). 
182. The following cases are not removable to federal court under the mass action provision: 
claims that arise from a single event in the state in which the action is filed or in a “contiguous” 
state; the defendant moves to join the plaintiffs’ claims; the claims are asserted on behalf of the 
general public; and claims that are consolidated for pre-trial purposes only. Id. 
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I)–(IV).  
183. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5 (2005). 
184. The mass action device is less understood than the class action device in part because it is 
simply a newer device. As discussed throughout this Comment, it came into existence only with 
CAFA’s passage in 2005. See, e.g., Cook & Larkin, supra note 151, at 11. In contrast, the class 
action device evolved from bills of peace at common-law in seventeenth century England. See 
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., Representative Suits—1, in SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY: FIVE LECTURES 
DELIVERED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 199, 200–01 (1950). In addition, the way courts have 
described their experiences tackling the mass action provision also shows that the provision is less 
well understood than the class action device. See supra Part II. 
185. See 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 16, § 6:17. 
186. See In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 572–73 (7th Cir. 2012) (accepting defendant’s 
argument that a motion for a bellwether trial is a proposal for a joint trial under CAFA). 
187.  Rich Samp, Ninth Circuit Endorses Gaming of Class Action Fairness Act and Creates 
Circuit Split, FORBES (Sept. 26, 2013, 11:08 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2013/09/26/ 
ninth-circuit-endorses-gaming-of-class-action-fairness-act-and-creates-circuit-split/; Rich Samp, 
Plaintiffs’ Bar Effort to Game Class Action Fairness Act Expands to Tenth Circuit, FORBES (Oct. 
31, 2013, 10:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2013/10/31/plaintiffs-bar-effort-to-game-
class-action-fairness-act-expands-to-tenth-circuit/; Rich Samp, Eighth Circuit Ruling Deepens 
Circuit Split on Class Action Fairness Act Circumvention Tactic, FORBES (Nov. 19, 2013, 1:54 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2013/11/19/eighth-circuit-ruling-deepens-circuit-split-on-
class-action-fairness-act-circumvention-tactic/ [hereinafter Samp, Eighth Circuit Ruling]. 
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expose what they were really up to, and uphold Congress’s intent in 
passing CAFA.”188 And many lawyers have written pieces briefing 
clients and other practitioners on developments in mass action 
litigation,189 to inform them about plaintiffs “manipulat[ing] their 
lawsuits to circumvent CAFA jurisdiction.”190 Thus, mass actions are 
increasingly relevant, despite commentators’ assertions that they would 
not be.191 It is therefore important that the federal courts use a uniform 
framework to construe their jurisdiction under the provision. 
This Comment seeks to clarify how federal courts should do that 
when presented with a purported mass action on removal. Part III 
discusses federal court subject matter jurisdiction in general to 
demonstrate that federal courts usually construe their jurisdiction 
narrowly. It describes some instances, however, in which federal courts 
will go beyond superficially examining the extent of their subject matter 
jurisdiction in order to balance the rights of plaintiffs as masters of the 
complaint and of defendants who are entitled to a statutory right of 
removal. 
III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 
The mass action question is, at bottom, jurisdictional. Litigants have 
been testing the full expanse of that jurisdiction, and, in doing so, have 
raised important questions about the boundaries between state and 
federal courts;192 between the courts’ role in interpreting the law and in 
188. Samp, Eighth Circuit Ruling, supra note 187.  
189. See, e.g., Pogust & Gruver, supra note 163, at 58. 
190. Id. 
191. But see 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 16, § 6:24 (“Because mass actions tend 
to occur in jurisdictions without class actions and cannot be called into being by a defendant’s 
joinder motion, they do not arise that frequently.”).  
192. Removal of a case from state to federal court necessarily implicates the relationship between 
the state court and federal court systems. See Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 576 
(5th Cir. 2004) (“[O]ur insistence that diversity removal, powerful as it is, remain within its 
congressionally marked traces is demanded by principles of comity and federalism—that a state 
court is to be trusted to handle the suit unless the suit satisfies the removal requirements.”); Univ. of 
S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Because removal jurisdiction 
raises significant federalism concerns, federal courts are directed to construe removal statutes 
strictly.” (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1941))); In re 
Facebook, Inc., IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 922 F. Supp. 2d 475, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Removal 
statutes are to be ‘strictly construed . . . because removal of a case implicates significant federalism 
concerns.’” (quoting In re NASDAQ Market Makers Antitrust Litig., 929 F. Supp. 174, 178 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996))).  
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Congress’ ability to enact its will through legislation;193 and between 
plaintiffs’ role as masters of their complaints and defendants’ statutory 
rights to a federal forum.194 How federal courts should interpret and 
confine their jurisdiction underlies all of these inquiries, so this 
Comment next turns to subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts. 
A. Carefully Bounding Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
It is a maxim every first-year law student learns: Federal courts are 
courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction.195 Because of this 
limitation, “[f]ederal courts are presumed not to have jurisdiction,”196 
and the presumption prevails because parallel systems of state and 
national government co-exist in the United States’ federal system of 
government.197 Once the federal Constitution was enacted, federal courts 
were only given jurisdiction over limited areas of law as set out in 
Article III because of concern for existing state court systems.198 In 
193. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (“Article 
III, § 1, serves both to protect ‘the role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme 
of tripartite government,’ and to safeguard litigants’ ‘right to have claims decided before judges 
who are free from potential domination by other branches of government.’” (internal citations 
omitted)).  
194. A defendant may have a right to remove a case from state to federal court if it meets 
statutory requirements created by Congress. See Eufaula Drugs, Inc. v. Tmesys, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 
2d 1240, 1241 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (“One statutory right of removal provided to the defendant[ is] 
based on ‘complete’ diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction . . . . Another statutory right of removal 
exists under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.”) (internal citations omitted)); Feldman v. N.Y. 
Life Ins. Co., No. CIV. A. 97-4684, 1998 WL 94800, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 1998) (forbidding 
plaintiffs to “manipulate federal jurisdiction and defeat the Defendant’s statutory right of removal”). 
However, the plaintiff is the acknowledged “master of the complaint.” See Caterpillar Inc. v. 
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (noting in the federal question context that “the plaintiff [is] the 
master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.”). 
195. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) (“Federal 
courts, unlike state courts, are not general common-law courts . . . .”); Owen Equip. Erection Co. v. 
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978) (“It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of 
limited jurisdiction.”).  
196. 1 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, L.ED. § 1:12 (2013). 
197. “Federal: Of or relating to a system of associated governments with a vertical division of 
governments into national and regional components having different responsibilities.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 685 (9th ed. 2009). 
198. See South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 396 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“The 
Framers obviously thought that the national government should have a judicial system of its own 
and that that system should have a Supreme Court. However, because the Framers believed the State 
courts would be adequate for resolving most disputes, they generally left Congress the power of 
determining what cases, if any, should be channelled to the federal courts.”); Hulett v. McMain, 
Civil Action No. 9:07cv223, 2008 WL 58971, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 2, 2008) (“If Congress has not 
conferred jurisdiction upon the federal courts, the state courts become the sole vehicle for obtaining 
initial review of some claims.”). 
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addition, the Framers left the decision whether to establish “inferior” 
tribunals to Congress—a body made up of individual legislators 
representing states.199 It is against this history and structure that all 
questions of federal court jurisdiction must be examined. 
Subject matter jurisdiction is not a purely academic matter because 
“[w]ithout jurisdiction [a] court cannot proceed at all.”200 Jurisdiction “is 
power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function 
remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the 
cause.”201 It is “inflexible and without exception.”202 Whether a federal 
court can hear a case involves complex questions of the relationship 
between the federal government and the states, and of the relationship 
between the three branches of federal government—executive, 
legislative, and judicial. 
It does not matter that the jurisdictional question is complex and more 
difficult than a decision on the merits otherwise would be. In a 
particularly striking example, a unanimous Supreme Court struck down 
the doctrine of “hypothetical jurisdiction,” which had emerged in some 
Circuit Courts of Appeals.203 That doctrine allowed federal courts “to 
proceed immediately to the merits question, despite jurisdictional 
objections” when the merits question was easier to resolve and where the 
party that prevailed on the merits was the same party that would prevail 
if there was no jurisdiction.204 In this case, the Court was presented with 
both a jurisdictional issue and a merits question about whether the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right–To–Know Act of 1986 
authorized a private enforcement action for “purely past violations.”205 
The Court held that jurisdictional questions are a threshold matter.206 
The Court “decline[d] to endorse [the hypothetical] approach because it 
carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial action and 
thus offends fundamental principles of separation of powers.”207 It is 
unsurprising, then, that federal courts carefully protect the boundaries of 
their jurisdiction to ensure that they only adjudicate those matters 
properly before them. 
199. See U.S. CONST. art. III. 
200. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). 
201. Id. 
202. Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884). 
203. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). 
204. Id. at 93–94.  
205. Id. at 86. 
206. Id. at 94. 
207. Id. 
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There are many examples of federal courts—either through their own 
construction or as directed by congressional mandate—construing their 
subject matter jurisdiction narrowly to confine the expanse of their 
power. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), a removal statute, requires 
remand “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district 
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”208 It takes into account that 
additional parties might be added and cause jurisdictional defects.209 
Once that happens, the court may either retain its jurisdiction by refusing 
to permit the joinder that would destroy jurisdiction, or allow joinder and 
then remand the case.210 Congress does not direct the federal court to 
continue with the case if the court does not have jurisdiction. 
Similarly, the subject matter jurisdiction issue may be raised for the 
first time on appeal,211 which is exceptional in litigation.212 It is best 
explained by the insistence that federal courts act only when they have 
subject matter jurisdiction. In American Fire & Casualty Company v. 
Finn,213 a defendant removed to federal court and, at that time, resisted 
the plaintiff’s arguments that the federal court did not have subject 
matter jurisdiction.214 However, the defendant later raised lack of 
jurisdiction as a ground for removal after the plaintiff won on the 
merits.215 The Supreme Court found this maneuvering permissible 
because the federal court did not have the power to adjudicate a case 
improperly removed from state court.216 To have found otherwise 
“would by the act of the parties work a wrongful extension of federal 
jurisdiction and give district courts power the Congress has denied 
them.”217 Thus, these examples show that federal courts carefully police 
208. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012). 
209. Id. 
210. Id. (“If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would 
destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the 
action to the state court.”). 
211. 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3522. 
212. Id. 
213. 341 U.S. 6 (1951). 
214. Id. at 8–9. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 18. 
217. Id. However, where a jurisdictional defect is cured before the federal court notices the 
defect, it may nonetheless enter final judgment, Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 76–77 (1996) 
(“[N]o jurisdictional defect lingered through judgment in the District Court. To wipe out the 
adjudication postjudgment . . . would impose an exorbitant cost on our dual court system.”), and a 
federal court may rule on personal jurisdiction before it does so on subject matter jurisdiction, 
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578 (1999) (“Customarily, a federal court first 
resolves doubts about its jurisdiction over the subject matter, but there are circumstances in which a 
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their own jurisdiction to comport with values inherent in our federal 
system. 
Diversity jurisdiction in particular requires federal courts to take 
special care to ensure the boundaries of their jurisdiction are properly 
drawn. Because diversity jurisdiction is an aggressive assertion of 
federal power over ostensibly state issues,218 federal courts sitting in 
diversity employ a number of tools to deal with this tension and ensure 
proper respect for state courts in the federal system. For example, they 
may certify questions of state law to state courts to “build a cooperative 
judicial federalism.”219 They also attempt to construe state law as state 
courts would because “[t]he task of a federal court in a diversity action is 
to approximate state law as closely as possible in order to make sure that 
the vindication of the state right is without discrimination because of the 
federal forum.”220 When presented with a novel question of state law on 
which no state court has opined, the federal court will give the effect to 
the law that it believes the state court would have.221 In doing so, the 
federal court uses “intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions 
from other jurisdictions, statutes, treatises, and restatements as 
guidance.”222 These practices illustrate the concern federal courts have 
with adequately addressing the tension between their jurisdiction and a 
state’s prerogative to define and develop its own law. 
B. Beyond the Jurisdictional Pleadings 
Tension between plaintiffs and defendants always exists no matter the 
basis for subject matter jurisdiction. That is because the plaintiff is the 
district court appropriately accords priority to a personal jurisdiction inquiry.”). 
218. FALLON, JR., ET AL., supra note 179, at 1356. 
219. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390–91 (1974). Judicial federalism is “the separation 
of judicial authority between federal courts and state courts.” POLITICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF U.S. 
STATES AND REGIONS 819 (2009) (Donald P. Haider-Markel ed., 2009). 
220. Tate v. Trialco Scrap, Inc., 908 F.2d 974 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[W]e overturn a district court’s 
conclusions on questions of state law only if they are ‘clearly wrong.’”); In re Air Crash Disaster 
Near Chi., Ill. on May 25, 1979, 701 F.2d 1189, 1196 (7th Cir. 1983) (“Considered dicta of a state 
supreme court must be given weight by a federal court in ascertaining state law . . . .”); Perkins v. 
Bd. of Dir. of Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 13, 686 F.2d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 1982) (“[W]e should look to [state 
court] statements as indicia of how the state’s highest court might decide.”); Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 
615 F.2d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The court below, sitting as a federal district court in a diversity 
action, was obliged to apply the substantive law of the state in which it sat . . . .”).  
221. See Assurance Co. of Am. v. Wall & Assocs. LLC of Olympia, 379 F.3d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 
2004) (“[W]hen interpreting state law, federal courts are bound by decisions of the state’s highest 
court.” (quoting Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196, 1206 (9th Cir. 1998))). 
222. Id.  
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master of the complaint, but the defendant may have a statutory right of 
removal, assuming all of the requirements for jurisdiction are met, and 
therefore also has some basis for directing the litigation.223 The court 
then must also grapple with this tension when it intersects with the 
question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Federal 
courts have not always been willing to engage in this inquiry, but they 
started doing so in the modern era to balance these interests. 
Because these tensions might have led courts to deviate from strictly 
construing subject matter jurisdiction, federal courts in the 1800s 
generally did not inquire into the litigants’ tactics when determining 
whether they had subject matter jurisdiction.224 The adherence to the 
maxim that federal courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction 
was nearly absolute.225 While this approach respected the powers of the 
federal and state courts, it did not take into account other concerns. It 
“ignore[d] the use of techniques that undermined a party’s legitimate 
statutory right to choose a federal forum.”226 Thus, the courts allowed 
“activities by the state court plaintiff obviously undertaken solely to 
prevent the federal courts from exercising diversity jurisdiction” through 
removal.227 In these instances, only state courts could address the effects 
of such maneuvers because no federal forum was available.228 But this 
rigidity has since been relaxed.229 
Federal courts are now interested in “the whims and tactical concerns 
of the litigants”230 when they construe their subject matter jurisdiction. 
That is, federal courts realize that subject matter jurisdiction is so 
important that they must—at least to some degree—investigate the 
parties’ claims of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than disposing of 
223. 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3641 (3d ed. 2008) (“If the plaintiff’s preference is for a 
state court, rather than a federal court, he or she simply may file suit in a state court. However, if 
[all of the requirements for diversity jurisdiction are met], the defendant . . . may thwart the 
plaintiff’s choice of a state forum by removing the suit to the federal court . . . .”). 
224. See, e.g., Oakley v. Goodnow, 118 U.S. 43, 45 (1886) (stating that federal courts have “no 
authority . . . to take jurisdiction of a case by removal from a state court when a colorable 
assignment has been made to prevent such a removal”); 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3641. 
225. 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3641. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. See Provident Sav. Life Assur. Soc. v. Ford, 114 U.S. 635, 641 (1885) (“[It would] be a 
good defense to an action in a state court to show that a colorable assignment has been made to 
deprive the United States court of jurisdiction; but . . . it would be a defense to the action, and not a 
ground of removing that cause into the federal court.”). 
229. 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3641 (discussing the evolution of federal courts’ 
inquiring into whether there were efforts by a party to defeat federal jurisdiction). 
230. Id. 
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them on facial grounds in all instances. Doing so presents “the difficult 
question of when following the complex rules of diversity jurisdiction 
and removal crosses the line that divides permitted gamesmanship from 
prohibited conduct.”231 Federal courts therefore are willing and able to 
investigate their jurisdiction in an effort to prevent gamesmanship that 
would lead the court to adjudicate a matter that it does not truly have 
jurisdiction over. It also does so when there are plausible allegations that 
a plaintiff is undermining a defendant’s ostensibly legitimate right to a 
federal forum.232 To understand this, it is helpful to briefly discuss how 
the courts analyze jurisdiction. 
The party seeking federal court jurisdiction has the burden of proving 
it by jurisdictional facts.233 Jurisdiction may be attacked by either the 
party opposing it or questioned by the court on facial or factual 
grounds.234 A facial inquiry into subject matter jurisdiction takes all 
allegations asserting jurisdiction as true because it is the allegations that 
are at issue, not a contention that jurisdiction cannot be proved.235 In a 
factual inquiry, however, the subject is the accuracy of the factual 
allegations, and the parties must demonstrate facts showing 
jurisdiction.236 In doing so, the courts may consider the pleadings and 
evidence outside of a complaint’s allegations submitted by the parties,237 
including affidavits, declarations, and testimonial evidence.238 The court 
can even “conduct a limited evidentiary hearing if necessary.”239 
Further, because the court’s power to hear the case is at issue, the court 
231. In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 07-MD-1871, MDL No. 
1871, 2014 WL 2011597, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2014). 
232. See id. 
233. See, e.g., Frederico v. Home Depot., 507 F.3d 188, 196 (3d Cir. 2007). 
234. 5B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 1350. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. 
238. See, e.g., Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 719 F.3d 818, 828 (7th Cir. 2013) (deposition 
testimony); Harris v. Rand, 682 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that “a district court may 
require additional proof” of jurisdictional facts); Green v. United States, 630 F.3d 1245, 1248 n.3 
(9th Cir. 2011) (“[P]roof of jurisdictional facts may be supplied by affidavit, declaration, or any 
other evidence properly before the court . . . .”); Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers 
Int’l Union v. Cont’l Carbon Co., 428 F.3d 1285, 1292–93 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that a motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may take the form of either a facial or a factual attack 
and that, on a factual attack, “the court must look beyond the complaint and has wide discretion to 
allow documentary and even testimonial evidence”); 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3641 
(discussing the evolution of federal courts’ inquiring into whether there were efforts by a party to 
defeat federal jurisdiction).  
239. Smith v. Bd. of Trs. Lakeland Cmty. Coll., 746 F. Supp. 2d 877, 888 (N.D. Ohio 2010). 
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is “entitled at any time sua sponte to delve into the issue of whether 
there is a factual basis to support the . . . exercise of subject matter 
jurisdiction.”240 This burden must be met by a preponderance of the 
evidence.241 
C. Probing the Litigants’ Claims to Find Fraudulent Joinder 
Despite the fundamental concern with construing subject matter 
jurisdiction narrowly, federal courts attempt to balance competing 
interests and therefore do not so narrowly construe their jurisdiction as 
to ignore all other important litigation principles. Rather, federal courts 
will pierce the parties’ pleadings to learn about the parties’ litigation 
strategy. Fraudulent joinder is a particularly helpful guide in creating a 
jurisdictional framework under the mass action provisions, discussed 
infra. 
Fraudulent joinder balances a plaintiff’s ability to plead around 
federal court jurisdiction,242 the defendant’s statutory right to removal,243 
and the power of the federal courts.244 A common technique to ensure 
240. Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., Div. of Ace Young Inc., 
109 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Watson v. Bretz & Coven LLP, No. 12 Civ. 1441 GBD 
KNF, 2013 WL 765361, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2013) (“[T]he party invoking federal jurisdiction 
must support the basis for jurisdiction alleged in its pleadings ‘with competent proof if a party 
opposing jurisdiction . . . challenges [the allegation] or if the court sua sponte raises the question.’” 
(quoting Linardos v. Fortuna, 157 F.3d 945, 947 (2d Cir. 1998))); Somboonmee v. Holder, 
3:100V167/MCR/EMT, 2011 WL 3625674, at *2 (N.D. Fla. July 18, 2011) (“[A] federal court is 
obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.”); Cole 
v. Martin, No. C-95-20373 RMW, 1995 WL 396844, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 1995) (“[A] district 
court may review the complaint and dismiss sua sponte those claims premised on meritless legal 
theories or that that clearly lack any factual basis.”). 
241. See, e.g., Frederick v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 1242, 1244 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(stating a defendant seeking removal under CAFA’s class action provisions must establish the 
amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence); Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953, 958 
(8th Cir. 2009) (“[A] party seeking to remove under CAFA must establish the amount in 
controversy by a preponderance of the evidence. . . .”); Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 
F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying “the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof to the 
removing defendant”). 
242. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (noting in the federal question 
context that “the plaintiff [is] the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by 
exclusive reliance on state law.”). 
243. See Eufaula Drugs, Inc. v. Tmesys, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1241 (M.D. Ala. 2006) 
(“One statutory right of removal provided to the defendant [is] based on ‘complete’ diversity-of-
citizenship jurisdiction . . . . Another statutory right of removal exists under the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005.” (internal citations omitted)); Feldman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV. A. 97-
4684, 1998 WL 94800, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 1998) (forbidding plaintiffs to “manipulate federal 
jurisdiction and defeat the Defendant’s statutory right of removal”). 
244. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (“Article 
III, § 1, serves both to protect ‘the role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme 
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that there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction and therefore to prevent a 
defendant from removing the state court suit to federal court is “to join a 
party whose presence in the case creates the prohibited cocitizenship on 
both sides of the litigation.”245 Federal courts developed the fraudulent 
joinder doctrine to root out gamesmanship that would go too far in the 
direction of destroying diversity jurisdiction.246 Indeed, pleading to 
avoid diversity jurisdiction—including under CAFA—“is permitted with 
some limitations; for example, the joinder must not be fraudulent.”247 It 
allows the federal court to inquire into the substantive or legal basis for a 
plaintiff’s claim if there are allegations that a party has been 
“fraudulently” joined to prevent diversity jurisdiction.248 However, the 
removing defendant need not show that “the joinder of a nondiverse 
party was motivated primarily by a desire to remain in state court or to 
prove that the state court plaintiff’s conduct constituted fraud in some 
legal sense.”249 But the defendant must show that there is no colorable 
basis for the plaintiff’s joinder.250 
The doctrine came into existence in the early 1900s to respond to 
“attempts to wrongfully deprive parties entitled to sue in the Federal 
Courts of the protection of their rights in those tribunals.”251 Under the 
fraudulent joinder doctrine, the question is whether the plaintiff had a 
reasonable basis for the claim against the non-diverse party: “A 
defendant is fraudulently joined ‘where there is no reasonable basis in 
fact or colorable ground supporting the claim against the joined 
defendant’ or where there is ‘no real intention in good faith to prosecute 
the action against the defendant or seek a joint judgment.’”252 A federal 
court faced with the specter of fraudulent joinder “may look only to the 
contents of the pleadings or the court may choose to look ‘beyond the 
pleadings’ or to what has been referred to in some judicial opinions as 
summary-judgment-type evidence, as many district judges have chosen 
of tripartite government,’ and to safeguard litigants’ ‘right to have claims decided before judges 
who are free from potential domination by other branches of government.’” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
245. 13F WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3641.1. 
246. Id. 
247. In re Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 07-MD-1871, 2014 WL 
2011597, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2014). 
248. 13F WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3641.1. 
249. Id. 
250. Id. 
251. Ala. Great S. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U.S. 206, 128 (1906). 
252. In re Avandia, 2014 WL 2011597, at *3 (quoting Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 
108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990)).  
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to do.”253 Thus, the federal courts may engage in either a facial or factual 
inquiry. When courts do the latter, however, they are careful to note that 
they should not “pre-try the merits of the case.”254 
Thus, federal courts, while concerned with the proper limits of their 
subject matter jurisdiction, sometimes balance that consideration with 
the litigants’ strategies. In that balancing, they will go beyond the 
pleadings and find out what the litigants’ strategy is, even though it may 
require extra administration on the courts’ part. It is important to the 
administration of the federal court system because it preserves the 
narrowness of the federal courts’ jurisdiction as the federal structure 
contemplates, but it also facilitates Congress’ decision to extend 
diversity jurisdiction to both plaintiffs and defendants. While some 
commentators have asserted that CAFA ends the problem of fraudulent 
joinder in mass and class actions,255 the framework in those cases 
endures in the mass action context as a helpful example of how federal 
courts should analyze their jurisdiction when presented with allegations 
that plaintiffs are gaming diversity jurisdiction. This Comment next 
turns to that framework. 
IV. MASS ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
Congress extended subject matter jurisdiction to certain aggregate 
state court litigation when it enacted CAFA’s mass action section.256 
Situated within the federal diversity statute, litigants—both plaintiffs and 
defendants— have used the mass action provisions to test the boundaries 
of federal court jurisdiction.257 Their litigation implicates to what extent 
plaintiffs may structure their suits to keep them in state court and how 
the plaintiffs’ procedural maneuvers in state court should be analyzed in 
determining whether there is federal court jurisdiction upon removal. 
Three considerations therefore are central to defining the mass action 
provisions’ contours: (1) the proper scope of federal court jurisdiction; 
(2) which forum litigants may invoke—state or federal; and (3) how 
courts should effectuate Congress’ intent. 
253. 13F WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3641.1. 
254. Id. 
255. See id. (“Congress’ enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 . . . will have the 
effect of reducing the fraudulent joinder problem in class and mass actions.”). 
256. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11) (2012). 
257. See, e.g., Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 736, 741 (2014) 
(addressing defendant’s argument that there are more than 100 real parties in interest when a state 
sues under the parens patriae doctrine). 
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The primary difficulty in interpreting the mass action provisions 
concerns when a group of plaintiffs have proposed a joint trial for 
common issues of law or fact.258 That is because the federal courts have 
employed different, and sometimes conflicting, approaches to determine 
whether there has been such a proposal.259 Indeed, it is difficult to draw 
strict lines around the different interpretations, which further 
demonstrates that there is a lack of interpretive coherence in the federal 
courts’ mass action decisions. That lack of coherence has produced a 
jumbled doctrine and done a disservice to litigants. It has enabled 
creative attempts to circumvent or create federal court jurisdiction 
because no guiding principle or analysis has been announced. This 
Comment comprehensively identifies common threads in the federal 
courts’ attempts so far to define their mass action jurisdiction and to 
reconcile those threads with the 2014 Supreme Court decision on mass 
action jurisdiction in parens patriae suits. With these fundamental 
elements in place, the Comment then proposes a framework for 
construing mass action jurisdiction. 
A. The Formalist Approach and the Expansive Approach 
This Comment proposes that the federal courts’ interpretive 
approaches to the mass action provisions can be defined in two ways: (1) 
a formal view that is supported by taking the plaintiffs’ state court 
procedural actions at face value and not inquiring into motives or 
effects; and (2) an expansive view of federal court jurisdiction enabled 
by piercing the parties’ pleadings and assessing the plaintiff’s litigation 
strategy. In reality, the courts’ analyses are somewhat novel for each 
mass action jurisdiction question, but these categories present an 
analytically helpful starting point. This Part discusses some of the cases 
falling within these approaches. In doing so, however, the Comment 
highlights how the lack of coherence in the approaches makes it difficult 
258. See, e.g., Corber v. Xanodyne Pharm., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) 
(“The parties dispute only whether Plaintiffs’ petitions for coordination constitute proposals for the 
cases ‘to be tried jointly’ under CAFA.”); Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, 749 F.3d 879, 886 (10th 
Cir. 2014) (“[Defendants] . . . contended that jurisdiction was available under CAFA’s ‘mass action’ 
provision because . . . plaintiffs had proposed a joint trial of claims involving more than 100 
plaintiffs.”); In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 570 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The parties petition us to 
resolve two conflicting district court decisions and decide whether a motion to consolidate and 
transfer related state court cases to one circuit court through trial constitutes a proposal to try the 
cases jointly . . . .”); Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 953 (9th Cir. 2009) (“By its plain 
terms, § 1332(d)(11) therefore does not apply to plaintiffs’ claims in this case, as . . . neither the 
parties nor the trial court has proposed consolidating the actions for trial.”). 
259. See infra Part IV.A. 
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to predict how the outcome of one case will influence a later case. 
Congress stated that CAFA’s mass action provisions should be 
construed broadly to sweep as many aggregate state court suits as 
possible into federal court.260 The Senate Report “explicitly encourages 
courts to look past the labels used by the parties.”261 Congress’ 
encouragement suggests that its preferred framework for determining 
whether plaintiffs have proposed a joint trial is a broad one.262 But 
Congress’ view does not exist in a vacuum. It must be reconciled with 
how federal courts interpret their subject matter jurisdiction. This is 
increasingly important because, “[t]o evade federal jurisdiction, counsel 
for mass actions commonly file multiple, identical state court actions, 
each proposing to try the claims of fewer than 100 plaintiffs.”263 As 
mass action litigation is likely to become more prevalent,264 the need for 
a coherent standard to assess jurisdiction becomes greater. 
In general, some courts have narrowly construed their jurisdiction by 
limiting their consideration of the proposal for joint trial to the plain 
language of the plaintiffs’ motions,265 and do not look at what the 
underlying litigation strategy is.266 Usually, the court will not find a 
260. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5 (2005). 
261. Guyon Knight, Note, The CAFA Mass Action Numerosity Requirement: Three Problems 
with Counting to 100, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1875, 1894 (2010). 
262. See, e.g., id. 
263.  Pogust & Gruver, supra note 163, at 58. 
264. Because the class action device has been cut back to such a degree, litigants appear to be 
using more creative attempts to achieve global settlement of large-scale torts and other kinds of 
litigation. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, Mass Litigation Governance in the Post-Class Action Era: The 
Problems and Promise of Non-removable State Actions in Multi-District Litigation, 5 J. TORT L. 1, 
2 (2014) (“In the world of mass litigation, claimants, judges, and attorneys alike remain on a quest 
to achieve global peace of countless, but related, lawsuits. Yet the paradigmatic mechanism for 
achieving this elusive goal—the class action device—has been more enfeebled than ever, both by 
limitations inherent in the device itself and by limitations increasingly imposed by the courts.”); 
accord Myriam Gilles & Anthony Sebok, Crowd-Classing Individual Arbitrations in a Post-Class 
Action Era, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 457 (2014) (“Class action litigation is in decline.”) (citing Joel 
S. Feldman, et al., Evidentiary and Burden of Proof Standards for Class Certification Rulings, 11 
CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 536, 541 (2010)). 
265. See Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, 749 F.3d 879, 885 (10th Cir. 2014) (cataloging the 
plaintiffs’ pleadings in the separate actions, which expressly disclaimed federal jurisdiction and 
consolidation for any purpose other than pre-trial activities, and which did not include more than 
100 plaintiffs in any one suit); Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 953 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(rejecting defendants’ argument that there was a mass action because “Congress appears to have 
foreseen the situation presented in this case and specifically decided the issue in plaintiffs’ favor”). 
266. Parson, 749 F.3d at 886 (“At the outset, we note that it seems clear that the plaintiffs’ choice 
to file separate suits, each containing fewer than 100 plaintiffs, cannot simply be disregarded as 
procedural gamesmanship and their ‘civil action’ summarily treated as a single one containing 650 
plaintiffs.”); Tanoh, 561 F.3d at 953 (“Relying on both the Act’s legislative history and two recent, 
out-of-circuit decisions interpreting a separate provision of the Act, Dow urges us to conclude that 
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removable mass action.267 Other courts have probed the plaintiffs’ 
pleadings to determine whether the suits were originally brought as 
individual suits to avoid federal court jurisdiction.268 When engaging in 
this inquiry, courts will usually find that they have subject matter 
jurisdiction over the mass action.269 The rest of this Part addresses the 
two approaches. 
1. The Formal Approach 
Some federal courts will not look beyond the face of the plaintiffs’ 
motion in state court and therefore will not find a mass action. The court 
will not impute to the plaintiffs intent to propose a joint trial where one 
is not clear.270 (And, in one instance, a court seemed not to find a 
proposal because the plaintiffs did not use the explicit language “propose 
to try claims jointly.”271) The court does not look at what effect the 
motion will actually have in state court nor does it investigate further 
whether plaintiffs have pled their cases in this particular way to avoid 
federal court jurisdiction. 
In Tanoh v. Dow Chemical,272 the defendants who removed the 
purported mass action argued that the plaintiffs had strategically 
structured their state court complaints to avoid federal jurisdiction.273 
plaintiffs’ seven actions, viewed together, constitute a single ‘mass action’ under CAFA. Dow’s 
arguments are unpersuasive . . . .”). 
267. Tanoh, 561 F.3d at 956 (“None of the seven state court actions removed to federal court by 
Dow involves the claims of one hundred or more persons proposed to be tried jointly . . . .”); see 
also Parson, 749 F.3d at 886. 
268. See Atwell v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 740 F.3d 1160, 1163 (8th Cir. 2013) (“The answer to” 
the question of whether plaintiffs proposed a joint trial “requires careful review of the proceedings 
in the City of St. Louis Circuit Court.”); In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 572 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(“[A] proposal for a joint trial can be implicit.”). 
269. Atwell, 740 F.3d at 1166 (“We conclude that, at the time the cases were removed, the 
motions for assignment to a single judge filed by the three plaintiff groups to the same state circuit 
court, combined with plaintiffs’ candid explanation of their objectives, required denial of the 
motions to remand.”); In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d at 573 (“Plaintiffs may not have explicitly 
asked that their claims be tried jointly, but the language in their motion comes very close.”). 
270. See Parson, 749 F.3d at 892 (collecting cases and determining that the court could not find a 
mass action “solely because the plaintiffs filed multiple cases each containing fewer than 100 
claims”); Tanoh, 561 F.3d at 953 (“By its plain terms, § 1332(d)(11) therefore does not apply to 
plaintiffs’ claims in this case, as . . . neither the parties nor the trial court has proposed consolidating 
the actions for trial.”).  
271. See, e.g., Romo v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2013) (Gould, J., 
dissenting) (“The majority apparently would require an explicit request for a joint trial . . . .”), 
overruled by, Corber v. Xanodyne Pharm., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
272. 561 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2009). 
273. Id. at 953 (“Dow contends that allowing plaintiffs to ‘evade’ CAFA by ‘artificially 
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined the defendants’ 
invitation to investigate the plaintiffs’ litigation strategy and find mass 
action jurisdiction.274 Instead, it determined it would look no further than 
the statute’s “plain language,”275 which it found “consistent with both 
the well-established rule that plaintiffs, as masters of their complaint, 
may choose their forum by selecting state over federal court and with the 
equally well-established presumption against federal removal 
jurisdiction.”276 
Similarly, defendants before the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit argued that a mass action arose because the plaintiffs in eleven 
separate actions had filed suit in the same court and before the same 
judge.277 The defendants’ theory was that filing all of the suits in the 
same court before the same judge was a proposal for joint trial.278 But 
the Tenth Circuit found that 
[n]one of the individual actions contained 100 or more plaintiffs. 
Each of the actions included at least one . . . resident[ial] 
plaintiff. Each complaint specifically disclaimed federal 
question and federal diversity jurisdiction, and included 
provisions that admitted the claims had been joined for the 
purpose of pretrial discovery and proceedings but disclaimed 
joinder for trial purposes.279 
Based on the face of the plaintiffs’ pleadings, the Tenth Circuit was 
unwilling to go further and inquire into the plaintiffs’ litigation strategy 
and find federal court jurisdiction.280 It further noted that “plaintiffs’ 
choice to file separate suits . . . cannot simply be disregarded as 
procedural gamesmanship.”281 Therefore, where the requirements for 
federal jurisdiction under the mass action provision were not apparent on 
structur[ing]’ their lawsuits to avoid removal to federal court would be inconsistent with 
congressional purpose.”). 
274. Id. 
275. Id. at 956. 
276. Id. at 953. Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 2013 decision in Romo, 
731 F.3d 918 was overturned en banc, the court followed a similar approach when it was originally 
presented with twenty-six cases pending in state court. 
277. Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, 749 F.3d 879 (10th Cir. 2014).  
278. Id. at 887 (“[T]he defendants urge us to disregard the plaintiffs’ express statement that they 
have not joined their claims for trial. To hold otherwise, they claim, would be to exalt form over 
substance, sanction procedural gamesmanship, and thwart the Congressional intent behind 
CAFA.”). 
279. Id. 
280. Id. at 886. 
281. Id. 
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the face of the complaint, the court was unwilling to assert power over 
the state court suits, or even to inquire further about its jurisdiction. 
And, in Abrahamsen v. ConocoPhillips, Co.282 the defendants argued 
before the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that there was a mass 
action because there were four state court actions, which together totaled 
123 former employees, contractors, families, and estates.283 Again, the 
court was unwilling to infer a mass action: “Despite the similarities of 
their claims, Plaintiffs did not propose to try their claims jointly.”284 
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Third Circuit said that its reading was 
“consistent with the well-established rule of deference to plaintiffs’ 
choice of forum and the presumption against federal removal 
jurisdiction.”285 
Another Ninth Circuit case illustrates the outer boundaries of the 
formalist approach,286 although it has since been overruled after an en 
banc hearing.287 In 2012, the court determined that a coordination 
motion could not be construed as a proposal for joint trial because the 
plaintiffs did not explicitly mention a joint trial in their motion.288 The 
case involved twenty-six cases pending before the district court for 
alleged injuries from use of propoxyphene, an ingredient in prescription 
painkillers.289 More than forty actions had been filed in California state 
court at the time this question was presented to the Ninth Circuit.290 
Attorneys responsible for the pending state court actions petitioned the 
California Judicial Council to establish a coordinated proceeding for all 
of the California actions under California Code of Civil Procedure 
section 404.291 Section 404 allowed for coordination of “all of the 
actions for all purposes,” but the court found that “the plaintiffs’ petition 
for coordination stopped far short of proposing a joint trial.”292 In their 
submission to the California Judicial Council, the plaintiffs cited 
282. 503 F. App’x 157 (3d Cir. 2012). 
283. Id. at 159. 
284. Id. at 160. 
285. Id. 
286. Romo v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2013). 
287. Corber v. Xanodyne Pharm., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
288. Romo, 731 F.3d at 922–23 (finding that “[o]ne would be hard pressed to parse a proposal for 
a joint trial” from the language of plaintiffs’ coordination motion, even though plaintiffs moved for 
coordination for “all purposes”). 
289. Id. at 920. 
290. Id. 
291. Id. at 920–21. 
292. Id. at 922. 
 
                                                     
15 - Gitt_ Final Author Review_Approved 03.19.15.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/13/2015  11:57 AM 
490 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:453 
concerns about “a significant likelihood of duplicative discovery, waste 
of judicial resources and possible inconsistent judicial rulings on legal 
issues.”293 The Ninth Circuit found that “one would be hard pressed to 
parse a proposal for a joint trial from this language.”294 This is the 
starkest example of the formalist approach, although it is no longer 
followed.295 
The decisions in these three Circuits have several things in common. 
First, the courts were unwilling to inquire into the litigants’ strategies by 
requiring anything from the parties beyond the pleadings. They relied on 
the presumption against federal court jurisdiction as the basis for their 
truncated inquiry.296 But, in doing so, they failed to note that federal 
courts sometimes engage in a more searching inquiry, even against the 
backdrop of that presumption. The courts also stressed the importance of 
the plaintiffs’ right to their preferred forum,297 but did not mention 
anything about the defendant’s right to statutory removal. They failed to 
provide guidance as to what a proposal for a joint trial would be, 
focusing little on Congress’ preferred broad interpretation of CAFA 
jurisdiction.298 
293. Id. at 922–23. 
294. Id. at 923. 
295. See Corber v. Xanodyne Pharm., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218, 1220 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) 
(“Because we conclude that all of the CAFA requirements for a removable mass action are met 
under the totality of the circumstances in these cases, we reverse the district court’s remand 
orders.”). See infra Part V.B for discussion of how the effect of the state law or rule should factor 
into the federal court’s assessment of whether a mass action has been created by the plaintiffs’ 
motion. 
296. Abrahamsen v. ConocoPhillips, Co., 503 F. App’x 157, 160 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating that the 
court’s decision not to construe a mass action was “consistent with the well-
established . . . presumption against federal removal jurisdiction”); Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 
F.3d 945, 953 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that the court’s decision not to find a mass action was 
“consistent with . . . the well-established presumption against federal removal jurisdiction”). 
297. Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, 749 F.3d 879, 887 (10th Cir. 2014) (summarizing plaintiffs’ 
argument that “[t]hey are masters of their complaint, which they deliberately structured to avoid 
federal jurisdiction under CAFA”); Abrahamsen, 503 F. App’x at 160 (stating that the court’s 
decision not to construe a mass action was “consistent with the well-established rule of deference to 
plaintiffs’ choice of forum”); Tanoh, 561 F.3d at 953 (stating that the court’s decision not to 
construe a mass action was “consistent with . . . the well-established rule that plaintiffs, as masters 
of their complaint, may choose their forum by selecting state over federal court”). 
298. Parson, 749 F.3d at 889–90 (discussing Congress’ intent in passing CAFA, but not 
discussing how Congress said it wanted CAFA’s provisions to be interpreted); Abrahamsen, 503 F. 
App’x at 159–60 (stating that CAFA’s text was plain and therefore not resorting to analyzing 
congressional intent); Tanoh, 561 F.3d at 954 n.5 (stating that the Senate Report that accompanied 
CAFA was “of minimal, if any, value in discerning congressional intent, as it was not before the 
Senate at the time of CAFA’s enactment”). 
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2. The Expansive Approach 
Other courts, however, are willing to go beyond the face of the 
plaintiffs’ pleadings and find federal court jurisdiction. Indeed, the 
Seventh Circuit has determined that a proposal for a joint trial can be 
made implicitly.299 In In re Abbott Laboratories, Inc.,300 the Seventh 
Circuit found that plaintiffs had attempted to thwart removal to federal 
court by dividing their claims among multiple state court suits.301 The 
plaintiffs had filed ten state court consumer suits involving hundreds of 
plaintiffs, and then filed a motion to consolidate their cases and transfer 
them to one state circuit court, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 
384.302 The plaintiffs argued that this request was not a proposal for a 
joint trial because they had asked for separate bellwether trials rather 
than one full trial, and their motion did not address how the trials would 
be adjudicated.303 Thus, the face of the motion did not propose a joint 
trial.304 
But it did not matter to the court that the plaintiffs did not explicitly 
propose that the cases be tried jointly because the effect of their request 
was the same as that of a joint trial.305 What mattered to the court was 
that although “plaintiffs may not have explicitly asked that their claims 
be tried jointly . . . the language in their motion comes very close.”306 
Taking the approach that a court can imply subject matter jurisdiction 
when plaintiffs are “very close” to proposing a joint trial necessarily 
requires a court to look into what the effect of the plaintiff’s motion will 
be. 
The Eighth Circuit has also inferred a mass action by looking at the 
effect of the plaintiffs’ litigation strategy.307 In Atwell v. Boston 
Scientific Corp.,308 the plaintiffs filed a motion asking for a single judge 
299. In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 572 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[A] proposal for a joint trial can 
be implicit.”). 
300. Id. at 570. 
301. Id. at 570–71. 
302. Id. 
303. Id. at 572 (“Plaintiffs argue that they did not propose a joint trial because their motion to 
consolidate did not address how the trials of the various claims in the cases would be conducted, 
other than proposing that they all take place in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County.”). 
304. Id. 
305. Id. at 573 (“Plaintiffs may not have explicitly asked that their claims be tried jointly, but the 
language in their motion comes very close.”). 
306. Id. 
307. Atwell v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 740 F.3d 1160 (8th Cir. 2013). 
308. Id. 
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to handle the cases.309 To the court, this request was the same as 
proposing a joint trial.310 Although counsel “disavow[ed] a desire to 
consolidate cases for trial,” counsel “nonetheless urged the state court to 
assign the claims . . . to a single judge who could ‘handle these cases for 
consistency of rulings, judicial economy, [and] administration of 
justice.”311 The court refused to take the plaintiffs’ claims at face 
value,312 instead finding a joint trial had been proposed because the 
plaintiffs’ request would have had the same effect.313 
A couple of commonalities can be distilled from these Circuits’ 
treatment of mass actions. First, the courts looked at what effect the 
plaintiffs’ actions would have—if it is largely the same as a proposal for 
a joint trial, they will find a mass action has been created.314 The Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit did not, however, look at what effect a 
state court would give to the outcome of the state procedural maneuver 
the plaintiffs used, and the Seventh Circuit did so in only a cursory 
manner.315 Neither court discussed the plaintiffs’ role as masters of their 
complaints,316 and, perhaps more surprisingly, neither court discussed 
Congress’ stated desire for CAFA to be broadly construed, even though 
the courts’ decisions reflect a more expansive view of mass action 
jurisdiction.317 
The practical effect of the two approaches emerges from these 
309. Id. at 1161. 
310. Id. at 1163–64 (“The [plaintiffs’] motion did not request a common assignment with other 
transvaginal mesh plaintiffs, but plaintiffs . . . noted that the issues in the transvaginal mesh cases 
‘raise the potential for conflicted rulings through the discovery and motion process.’ . . . . Both 
groups [of plaintiffs] cited ‘avoiding conflicting pretrial rulings,’ ‘providing consistency in the 
supervision of pretrial matters, and ‘judicial economy’ as reasons for the assignment.”). 
311. Id. at 1165.  
312. Id. at 1166. 
313. Id. 
314. In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Plaintiffs may not have 
explicitly asked that their claims be tried jointly, but the language in their motion comes very 
close.”); Atwell, 740 F.3d at 1166 (“We conclude that, at the time the cases were removed, the 
motions for assignment to a single judge filed by the three plaintiff groups to the same state circuit 
court, combined with plaintiffs’ candid explanation of their objectives, required denial of the 
motions to remand.”). 
315. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in In re Abbott Laboratories, did address how 
the state law rule for consolidation may have played out in state court in making its determination 
that there was a removable mass action, but at the end of the opinion and without citing any state 
law. In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d at 573 (“In all likelihood, the [Illinois State] Supreme Court 
would transfer these actions back to one of the judicial circuits in which the suits are currently 
pending. As a result, plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate was sufficient to create a mass action.”). 
316. See generally In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568; Atwell, 740 F.3d 1160. 
317. See generally In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568; Atwell, 740 F.3d 1160. 
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comparisons: The more formal approach will allow fewer state court 
suits into federal court, while the expansive approach may allow more 
state court cases to be defined as mass actions and to be removed to 
federal court. 
B. The Supreme Court Looks at Mass Actions 
In 2014, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in the only mass action 
case that it has decided.318 Based on the particular procedural argument 
involved, however, the case likely has little relevance to mass action 
cases that are not brought by state attorneys general as parens patriae 
suits. 
In Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.,319 the Supreme 
Court decided a case involving a suit filed by Mississippi’s attorney 
general against manufacturers, sellers, and distributors of LCD panels.320 
The attorney general brought this suit in state court under the parens 
patriae doctrine—which gives a government standing to bring a lawsuit 
on behalf of its citizens321—and alleged price-fixing in violation of state 
law.322 The defendants removed the case to federal court, arguing that, 
even though there was ostensibly only one plaintiff in the case—the 
State of Mississippi—the federal courts should look instead at how 
many real parties in interest323 there were.324 Because those real parties 
in interest were the residents of Mississippi, the defendants argued that 
the 100-plaintiff threshold necessary to trigger CAFA’s mass action 
provision was easily met.325 
In its unanimous opinion, the Court declined the defendants’ 
invitation.326 Although the Court noted that in certain contexts federal 
courts are required to “look behind the pleadings to ensure that parties 
318. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014) is the 
only mass action case decided by the Supreme Court at the date of this Comment’s publication. 
319. Id. 
320. Id. at 741. 
321. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009). 
322. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 740. 
323. A real party in interest is a party “entitled under the substantive law to enforce the right sued 
upon and who generally, but not necessarily, benefits from the action’s final outcome.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1232 (9th ed. 2009). 
324. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 741–42. 
325. Id. at 742 (“Respondents argue that the [mass action] provision covers [parens patriae] suits 
because ‘claims of 100 or more persons’ refers to ‘the persons to whom the claim belongs, i.e., the 
real parties in interest to the claims,’ regardless of whether those persons are named or unnamed.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
326. Id. (summarizing respondents’ argument and stating that “[w]e disagree.”). 
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are not improperly creating or destroying diversity jurisdiction,”327 
Congress did not intend a “background principle of analyzing the real 
parties in interest to a suit” to be conducted in mass action cases.328 
Critical to the Court’s decision was Congress’ use of the word “plaintiff” 
in CAFA, rather than person.329 Thus, the Court found that the 
numerosity requirement can only be met by adding up all of the 
plaintiffs, not merely any party who has some remote interest in the 
litigation.330 The Court was also concerned with the administrative 
difficulties that would arise if federal courts had to inquire into whom 
the real parties in interest were for each suit before it.331 
While this case might suggest that the Supreme Court would analyze 
mass action jurisdiction using a narrow approach, much of the Court’s 
analysis appears to be limited to the context of parens patriae suits. For 
example, the Court noted that, in passing CAFA, Congress “focus[ed] on 
the persons who are actually proposing to join together as named 
plaintiffs in the suit.”332 It therefore acknowledged that courts in mass 
action cases would focus on who is involved in the lawsuit.333 This 
inquiry is distinct from the question of when plaintiffs have proposed a 
joint trial and created a mass action on that ground. 
But the Court also states that the mass action device is designed to 
prevent some level of gamesmanship and that courts sometimes need to 
look beyond pleadings. The Court described the “mass action provision” 
as “function[ing] largely as a backstop to ensure that CAFA’s relaxed 
jurisdictional rules for class actions cannot be evaded by a suit that 
names a host of plaintiffs rather than using the class device.”334 This 
language suggests that the federal courts should look at what the 
plaintiffs are actually proposing because the purpose of the mass action 
provision is to prevent evasion by plaintiffs. In addition, the Court notes 
that it has “interpreted the diversity jurisdiction statute to require courts 
in certain contexts to look behind the pleadings to ensure that parties are 
327. Id. at 745. 
328. Id. 
329. Id. at 743–44 (discussing how “plaintiffs” should be construed in the context of CAFA’s 
text). 
330. Id. at 744. 
331. Id. (“We think it unlikely that Congress intended that federal district courts engage in these 
unwieldy inquiries.”). 
332. Id. at 746. 
333. See id. (“Requiring district courts to pierce the pleadings to identify unnamed persons 
interested in the suit would run afoul of [congressional] intent.” (emphasis added)). 
334. Id. at 744. 
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not improperly creating or destroying diversity jurisdiction.”335 It then 
specifically mentions doing so in the fraudulent joinder context.336 Even 
though the Court did not construe the number of plaintiffs to be over 100 
by looking beyond the face of the complaint to the number of real parties 
in interest, it acknowledges that there are instances in which doing so is 
appropriate.337 Thus, the Court’s determination that only plaintiffs are to 
be counted in a mass action case provides little guidance to determining 
whether a joint trial has been proposed. The opinion does, however, 
support the notion that federal courts should look at the actual proposal 
to give it full effect. 
V. CONSTRUING MASS ACTION JURISDICTION 
This Part lays out an approach for federal courts to employ when they 
are presented with a question of whether they have subject matter 
jurisdiction over a purported mass action. Given the increasing relevance 
of such adjudication, the need for direction is clear. It is true that cases 
involving CAFA are “necessarily fact-specific” because the court has “to 
apply CAFA’s statutory principles to the particular jurisdictional facts 
involved.”338 However, the federal courts should employ some guiding 
principles in a coherent framework when construing mass action 
jurisdiction. This Comment therefore eschews the adoption of either a 
narrow or a broad approach to construing mass action jurisdiction; 
rather, it offers a new and more nuanced framework for determining 
whether federal jurisdiction has been created. 
This Comment proposes that courts look beyond the face of the 
plaintiff’s pleadings to determine the effect of the joinder in state court 
only when the removing defendant meets an initial burden of showing 
that plaintiffs have engaged in jurisdiction-circumventing behavior. The 
defendant would have to do so by affidavits and other evidence, which 
would lead the federal court to engage in a factual analysis of its subject 
matter jurisdiction. The court would then focus on the effect that the 
state court would give to the plaintiffs’ procedural motion that has 
arguably constituted a proposal for a joint trial, including presenting a 
certified question to the state supreme court if it is unclear to the federal 
335. Id. at 745. 
336. Id. (“We have held, for example, that a plaintiff may not keep a case out of federal court by 
fraudulently naming a nondiverse defendant.” (citing Wecker v. Nat’l Enamel & Stamping Co., 204 
U.S. 176, 185–86 (1907))).  
337. One such example is in the fraudulent joinder context. See id. 
338. Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, 749 F.3d 879, 890 (10th Cir. 2014). 
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court what that effect would be. This approach provides coherence and 
guidance for federal courts’ jurisdictional inquiry. It also best balances 
several values underlying the federal court system: the boundaries 
between federal and state courts; the ability of plaintiffs to choose their 
preferred forum; and defendants’ statutory rights of removal. 
A. Proposing a Joint Trial 
The first step is to distill a workable definition of a proposal for a 
joint trial by which the court can measure whether it has jurisdiction. 
Existing case law does not provide that definition, so this Comment 
proposes that it be interpreted as an affirmative action taken by plaintiffs 
that effectively aggregates the state court suits such that they will be 
resolved through the same proceeding. In short, two elements will have 
to be satisfied: (1) that the plaintiffs take some action, and (2) that the 
aggregation will lead to all of the state court cases being resolved 
through the same proceeding. This definition evolves from cases that 
have already grappled with determining what the statutory language 
means, and creates a clear starting point for federal courts construing 
their subject matter jurisdiction. 
The first part of this definition requires that the plaintiffs affirmatively 
do something to bring together the cases. This requirement is consistent 
with existing case law and with CAFA’s prohibition on federal court 
jurisdiction for mass actions created only by a defendant’s motion. For 
example, in Abrahamsen, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals did not find 
a mass action where four state court actions together totaled 123 
plaintiffs.339 The plaintiffs did not actually do anything in state court to 
bring together the suits; instead, they merely filed four separate suits.340 
An affirmative action to bring lawsuits together could be filing a motion 
for consolidation,341 for example, or proposing a bellwether trial that 
would likely result in settlement.342 
CAFA itself appears to call for this definition. It expressly forbids 
federal court jurisdiction over a “mass action” created by a defendant’s 
motion.343 It contemplated that only plaintiffs—and perhaps state 
339. Abrahamsen v. ConocoPhillips, 503 F. App’x 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2012). 
340. Id. 
341. See Corber v. Xanodyne Pharm., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
342. See In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 570 (7th Cir. 2012). 
343. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(II) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘mass action’ shall not include any 
civil action in which . . . the claims are joined upon motion of a defendant.”). 
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courts—could create a mass action.344 And by stating that plaintiffs must 
“propose” a mass action, it seems to require an act by the plaintiffs, not 
just that they bring into court any number of suits.345 Rather, the 
plaintiffs must later “propose”—that is, take some affirmative action—to 
bring the suits together where they were once separate. Although it 
remains unclear whether a state court may on its own create a removable 
mass action, it seems that the most appropriate interpretation is that a 
state court cannot itself create the mass action that a defendant may later 
remove. The statute explicitly says that a mass action comes into 
existence when the plaintiffs propose a joint trial.346 Thus, Congress 
seems to have thought that only plaintiffs could create a mass action, not 
state courts or defendants, at least within the meaning of CAFA. 
Existing case law also appears to recognize this. For example, in 
Anderson v. Bayer347 in the Seventh Circuit, Bayer removed several state 
cases to federal court on the ground that they constituted a mass action. 
Before removal, the plaintiffs had added a total of 111 plaintiffs to four 
existing lawsuits, so that—after the addition—the first suit was 
comprised of 100 plaintiffs, the second suit had five plaintiffs, the third 
suit had forty-five plaintiffs, and the fourth suit had eighteen 
plaintiffs.348 On appeal, Bayer urged the court not to put “too much 
weight on form.”349 The court, however, did not follow Bayer’s 
suggestion. It determined that the suits could be viewed as a mass action 
only because the defendants proposed that they be tried jointly, not 
because the plaintiffs did.350 The court found that Bayer’s removal was 
essentially a motion for consolidation, which does not trigger CAFA’s 
mass action provision.351 When plaintiffs do not take action to 
consolidate cases or otherwise try cases jointly, there is no mass action, 
even though the plaintiffs still may have structured their lawsuits to 
avoid federal court jurisdiction. 
The second part of this definition requires that the plaintiffs’ 
344. See id. 
345. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (“[T]he term ‘mass action’ means any civil action . . . in 
which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground 
that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact . . . .”). 
346. Id. 
347. 610 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2010). 
348. Id. at 392. 
349. Id. at 393. 
350. Id. at 393–94 (“Bayer’s argument that these separate lawsuits be treated as one action is 
tantamount to a request to consolidate them—a request that Congress has explicitly stated cannot 
become a basis for removal as a mass action.”). 
351. Id. 
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“proposal” result in a full resolution of the joined cases because of the 
proposed procedure. The statute itself says that a “joint trial” will trigger 
the mass action provision,352 but it should be the effect of the procedure, 
rather than the form, that is important. This means that procedures for 
disposing of all the cases—beyond just a trial—could satisfy this 
requirement. A bellwether trial, for example, could constitute full 
resolution of all of the cases. Thus, a joint trial should be interpreted as a 
procedural device that brings together all of the cases in such a way that 
they will be resolved together if it would have that effect in state court. 
The Seventh Circuit in In Re Abbott Laboratories, Inc. concluded 
similarly.353 It will not be enough that there have been multiple similar 
suits filed in state court. And because the court will be directed to look 
for two things, it will have a coherent approach for doing so and not 
have to devolve into saying that plaintiffs have done something “very 
close” to what CAFA requires and thereby imply a mass action. 
In sum, the federal courts should interpret CAFA’s statutory 
requirement that plaintiffs propose a joint trial to create a mass action as 
requiring an affirmative act by the plaintiffs that will lead to a full 
resolution of the cases as a result of that procedure. CAFA’s plain 
language supports this interpretation, as do parts of several mass action 
cases already decided in federal court. Applying this interpretation to the 
particular facts of a case would be the starting point for determining 
federal court jurisdiction. If there has been no affirmative act by the 
plaintiffs, the federal court’s inquiry will stop. If there has been, but the 
procedure that the plaintiffs have affirmatively sought would not 
feasibly lead to a full resolution of the case, the federal court’s inquiry 
will also stop. Only when these two criteria are met will the federal court 
go further in its inquiry and look to the effect of the state law. In taking 
that next step, the court should look at the effects of the litigants’ 
strategy to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. 
B.  Giving Effect to the State Court Procedure 
There is no mass action until the plaintiffs attempt to bring multiple 
suits together in a way that would lead to their resolution. There are—
and will continue to be—easy jurisdictional questions about CAFA’s 
352. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(1) (2012). 
353. In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that the plaintiffs motion 
came “very close” to a proposal for a joint trial and determining that the Illinois State Supreme 
Court likely would have “transfer[ed] these actions back to one of the judicial circuits in which the 
suits [we]re currently pending”). 
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mass action provisions that come before federal courts. Where that is the 
case, the federal courts need go no further than the face of the pleadings 
to discern whether they have jurisdiction. For example, when the 
plaintiffs have taken no affirmative action or have taken action that 
would not lead to complete resolution, a federal court would remand the 
case to state court because it would not have subject matter 
jurisdiction.354 
But where courts must go further in their inquiry, they should adhere 
to the requirement that the removing party bear the burden of proving 
federal court jurisdiction.355 The court should require factual evidence—
either because the party that opposes jurisdiction has brought a factual 
attack against federal court jurisdiction or on the federal court’s own 
motion—that establishes or disproves its jurisdiction.356 
This approach fits well within established judicial inquiry because of 
the highly fact-specific nature of the requirements for a proposal for a 
joint trial. For example, information about what the plaintiffs said in 
their motion or at a hearing in state court can provide insight into 
whether the plaintiffs took affirmative action. Similarly, it will be 
important to know the facts surrounding the motion. As described supra 
in Part III, the federal courts are entitled to receive and weigh factual 
evidence in assessing their subject matter jurisdiction. And, when 
presented with tough mass action jurisdiction questions, the courts of 
their own motion should require such evidence. Doing so will mitigate 
against overly formalistic assessments of jurisdiction that interfere with 
a defendant’s statutory right of removal and Congress’ intent to create a 
federal forum for aggregated state court litigation. It will also enable a 
court to broadly construe its federal court jurisdiction on a factual record 
354. See, e.g., Anderson, 610 F.3d at 393. 
355. See, e.g., Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 196 (3d Cir. 2007). 
356. See, e.g., Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., Div. of Ace 
Young Inc., 109 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Watson v. Bretz & Coven LLP, No. 12 Civ. 
1441(GBD)(KNF), 2013 WL 765361, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2013) (“[T]he party invoking federal 
jurisdiction must support the basis for jurisdiction alleged in its pleadings ‘with competent proof if a 
party opposing jurisdiction . . . challenges [the allegation] or if the court sua sponte raises the 
question.’” (quoting Linardos v. Fortuna, 157 F.3d 945, 947 (2d Cir. 1998))); Somboonmee v. 
Holder, No. 3:100V167/MCR/EMT, 2011 WL 3625674, at *2 (N.D. Fla. July 18, 2011) (“[A] 
federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be 
lacking.”); Cole v. Martin, No. C-95-20373 RMW, 1995 WL 396844, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 
1995) (“[A] district court may review the complaint and dismiss sua sponte those claims premised 
on meritless legal theories or that that clearly lack any factual basis.”). 
Such facts could include information about how the appropriate state court addresses such 
motions or facts gleaned about the plaintiffs’ litigation strategy, such as a plan to file a motion, but 
attempt to use language to circumvent federal court jurisdiction. 
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rather than based on how the aggregated litigation appears on the limited 
pleadings before the court. 
In assessing the defendant’s evidence of jurisdiction, the federal court 
should give appropriate consideration to the effect of the state court 
procedure. CAFA once again seems to require this outcome,357 and 
giving effect to state law is part of the well-developed doctrine federal 
courts use when they construe their subject matter jurisdiction in 
diversity cases. This inquiry should occur because the federal court’s 
jurisdiction is triggered only when there is a proposal for joint trial in 
state court, so the critical question will be what constitutes a joint trial in 
the state court. To properly respect the balance between federal and state 
courts, the federal court should give effect to how the state interprets its 
rule. When it is unclear how the state interprets such a procedural 
motion, the federal court should give the effect to the rule that it believes 
the state court would, as the federal courts do in other diversity cases.358 
First, CAFA’s mass action provision states that a mass action will not 
be created where “the claims have been consolidated solely for pretrial 
proceedings.”359 Some ostensibly identical state court procedural rules 
allow consolidation only for pretrial purposes, while others allow for 
consolidation through trial. For example, at least fifteen states have their 
own version of a multi-district litigation (MDL) statute360 that mirrors 
the federal MDL statute.361 But these statutes operate differently. For 
instance, Texas’s statute only allows consolidation or coordination for 
pretrial purposes, including summary judgment and other dispositive 
motions.362 It does not allow consolidation through trial.363 Thus, if a 
group of plaintiffs brought together multiple state court suits in Texas 
357. See Infra Part IV.B. 
358. See, e.g., Tate v. Trialco Scrap, Inc., No. 89-5837, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 11999, at *2 (6th 
Cir. July 16, 1990) (“[W]e overturn a district court’s conclusions on questions of state law only if 
they are ‘clearly wrong.’” (quoting Gee, 615 F.2d at 861 (9th Cir. 1980)); Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 
F.2d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chi., Ill. on May 25, 1979, 701 F.2d 
1189, 1196 (7th Cir. 1983) (“Considered dicta of a state supreme court must be given weight by a 
federal court in ascertaining state law . . . .”); Perkins v. Bd. of Dir. of Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 13, 
686 F.2d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 1982) (“[W]e should look to [state court] statements as indicia of how the 
state’s highest court might decide.”). 
359. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(IV) (2012). 
360. Yvette Ostolaza & Michelle Hartmann, Overview of Multidistrict Litigation Rules at the 
State and Federal Level, 26 REV. LITIG. 47, 69–75 (2007) (discussing multidistrict litigation rules at 
the state level). 
361. Id. 
362. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.161–164 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d Called Sess. of 
83rd Legis.); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE R. 13.  
363. Id. 
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via this statute, mass action jurisdiction would be improper because 
there would be no proposal for a “joint trial.”364 California, on the other 
hand (discussed supra), allows consolidation for “all purposes” through 
its statute.365 Thus, the consolidated cases would be able to proceed 
through trial.366 Because state laws operate differently even if they 
appear to have the same effect, Congress seems to have contemplated 
that federal courts would take into account the effect of the state court 
procedural rule when construing federal mass action jurisdiction. 
Indeed, this is the approach that the Ninth Circuit seems to have 
adopted in its en banc rehearing of Romo v. Teva Pharmaceutical.367 In 
that case, a group of attorneys for the forty separately filed actions in 
turn filed a single action asking for a coordinated proceeding to be 
established.368 It specifically asked for the proceeding to be coordinated 
“for all purposes.”369 The parties disputed whether the coordination 
petition was a proposal for a joint trial.370 In construing the petition as 
one for a joint trial in the rehearing, the Ninth Circuit looked to the 
“factor-based test [in California’s Code of Civil Procedure] to determine 
whether coordination [was] appropriate.”371 The court also stated that 
“[i]t is not clear whether the California Judicial Council would grant 
coordination for less than ‘all purposes.’”372 The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals recent en banc opinion supports the idea that federal courts 
should look at how the state procedural law operates in construing the 
plaintiffs’ proposal—especially because it recognizes that the state law 
may not support finding a mass action in every instance. But where the 
state law supports finding a joint trial—as California’s test did in this 
case—the federal court should find a joint trial. The court should not, as 
the Ninth Circuit correctly did not, make this determination without 
looking at the effect of the state procedural law. 
Second, federal courts have developed doctrines to guide when and 
how they may go beyond the parties’ pleadings to construe their 
jurisdiction.373 As discussed earlier, federal courts may make factual 
364. Id. 
365. CAL. R. CIV. P. 404. 
366. Id. 
367. 731 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2013). 
368.  Corber v. Xanodyne Pharm., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
369. Id. at 1221–22. 
370. Id. 
371. Id. at 1223. 
372. Id. at 1224. 
373. See supra Part III (discussing federal court construction of subject matter jurisdiction). 
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inquiries when they are assessing their subject matter jurisdiction, and 
they may require certain kinds of evidence to do so.374 Not only do 
federal courts engage in this inquiry, one of the two CAFA jurisdiction 
cases to come before the Supreme Court implicitly contemplates this 
approach.375 In Standard Fire v. Knowles, the Supreme Court noted that 
the district court looked at Knowles’ affidavit stipulating to seek 
damages below the amount in controversy.376 And the district court 
found from that evidence that the amount in controversy was below 
$5 million only because the plaintiff had stipulated to it.377 Thus, this 
approach is familiar to federal courts. 
This approach may pose additional administrative burdens for already 
over-worked federal courts.378 However, the courts have tools to require 
litigants to assist them in this administration. For example, district courts 
could impose local court rules that require a brief statement of relevant 
state procedural law when a defendant removes a purported mass action. 
Even if, however, this approach does impose some additional work, that 
may just be the trade-off required given the complexity of mass action 
litigation. In AU Optronics, the Court determined that a court could not 
construe parens patriae suits as having over 100 real parties in interest 
because CAFA was concerned only with counting the number of 
plaintiffs.379 But the Court did not preclude federal courts from inquiring 
beyond the face of the plaintiffs’ pleadings when they were presented 
with a question of how many plaintiffs would be joined together.380 In 
addition, the Court also recognized the doctrine of fraudulent joinder, 
which directs federal courts to look beyond the face of the pleadings.381 
It is therefore not out of the ordinary for federal courts to probe further 
than the face of pleadings in jurisdictional inquiries. 
While the Supreme Court has found in the class action context that 
giving effect to state procedural rules would be too onerous, it would be 
unlikely to do so in the mass action context. In Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,382 the Supreme Court did not allow 
374. See id. (discussing same). 
375. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1348–50 (2013). 
376. Id. 
377. Id. 
378. See, e.g., Alexander Bickel, The Overworked Court, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 17, 2011), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/book/review/the-overworked-court. 
379. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 736, 746 (2014). 
380. Id. 
381. Id. at 744; see also supra Part III (discussing fraudulent joinder doctrine). 
382. 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
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federal courts to engage in the additional inquiry of whether “state and 
federal rules conflict based on the subjective intentions of the state 
legislature.”383 It did not do so because it would create “an enterprise 
destined to produce ‘confusion worse confounded.’”384 Administrative 
problems would become overwhelming for federal courts because the 
courts “would have to discern, in every diversity case, the purpose 
behind any putatively pre-empted state procedural rule, even if its text 
squarely conflicts with federal law.”385 But there is a key distinction 
between this case and one involving a mass action: Shady Grove 
concerned Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,386 while mass action 
cases concern the federal court’s statutory jurisdiction. Thus, we should 
look not to administrative problems generated by an inquiry into 
conflicting federal rules and state procedural rules, but into how the 
federal courts typically construe their subject matter jurisdiction and 
how they generally operate in diversity cases. As discussed earlier in 
Part III, federal courts sitting in diversity may inquire into the parties’ 
litigation strategy to see whether they are improperly circumventing or 
creating federal court jurisdiction.387 Federal courts also—as a matter of 
course—give effect to state law when adjudicating diversity suits. Thus, 
this Comment proposes that the federal courts use these familiar tools 
when confronted with difficult questions of mass action jurisdiction. 
Doing so may cause some additional administrative burdens, but those 
burdens may be necessary to properly respect the role of state courts in 
the federal system and to balance the rights of plaintiffs and defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress passed CAFA in 2005 to provide a federal forum for 
aggregate litigation of “national importance.” In doing so, it created the 
mass action, which had previously been solely a creature of state court. 
Federal courts have had difficulty construing their subject matter 
jurisdiction under CAFA’s mass action provisions. Some federal courts 
have interpreted their mass action jurisdiction expansively, while others 
have interpreted it narrowly. But there has been no principled approach. 
This Comment takes the important step of proposing such an approach, 
one that is rooted in traditional constructions of federal court subject 
383. Id. at 404. 
384. Id. (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).  
385. Id. 
386. Id. 
387. See supra Part III.C. 
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matter jurisdiction. First, it proposed that the federal courts uniformly 
interpret the proposal for a joint trial to require some affirmative 
procedural act by the state court plaintiffs that would lead to the final 
disposition of the newly aggregated cases. The federal court would then 
pierce the parties’ pleadings if the court’s subject matter jurisdiction was 
not clear on the face of the pleadings, giving the same effect to the 
underlying state court procedural mechanism that the state court would. 
This proposal provides stability for both litigants and the courts, and 
balances a number of important judicial principles, primarily that federal 
courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction and the right of 
the plaintiff to choose the forum and the defendant’s statutory right of 
federal jurisdiction. 
The need for a coherent and principled framework is not merely 
academic. Given that litigants are routinely invoking or trying to avoid 
mass action jurisdiction, it is time for the federal courts to provide a 
consistent framework for working with this thorny jurisdictional issue. 
 
 
